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“SMILE – YOU’RE ON CELLPHONE CAMERA!”:
REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY IN THE MYSPACE GENERATION
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON*
ABSTRACT
In the latest Batman movie,1 Bruce Wayne’s corporate right hand man,
Lucius Fox, copes stoically with the death and destruction dogging his boss.
Interestingly, the last straw for him is Bruce’s request that he use digital
video surveillance created through the city’s cellphone network to spy on the
people of Gotham City in order to locate the Joker. Does this tell us
something about the increasing social importance of privacy, particularly in
an age where digital video technology is ubiquitous and largely
unregulated?
While much digital privacy law and commentary has focused on text files
containing personal data, little attention has been paid to privacy interests in
video files that may portray individuals in an unflattering or embarrassing
light. As digital video technology is now becoming widespread in the hands
of the public, this focus needs to shift. Once a small percentage of online
content, digital video images are now appearing online at an exponential
rate. This is largely due to the growth of online video sharing services such
as YouTube, MySpace, Flickr, and Facebook. The sharing of images online
is now a global phenomenon – as is the lack of explicit legal protection for
privacy rights in these images.
This article examines the extent to which we do, or should, have privacy
rights in digital video content. It then considers the most effective approach
for regulating online video privacy. It suggests that pure legal regulation,
without more, is unlikely to be up to the task. Instead, a combination of
regulatory modalities will be required to effectively protect privacy interests
in digital video files. These modalities will likely include the four regulatory
modalities previously identified by Professor Lawrence Lessig: legal rules,
social norms, system architecture, and market forces. Additionally, new
regulatory modalities may need to be developed. These might include public
education and non-profit institutions recognized in a regulatory role.

*

Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Technology and the Arts, Associate Director,
Frederick K Cox International Law Center, Director, Cyberspace Law and Policy Office, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106, USA, Email:
Jacqueline.Lipton@case.edu, Fax: (216) 368 2086. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article,
the author would like to thank Professor Andrea Matwyshyn and participants at a panel on user-generated
content and privacy at “Computers, Freedom and Privacy ‘08” at Yale University on May 21, 2008, as well
as participants at the 8th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars’ Conference at Stanford Law School on
August 7-8, 2008. Thanks are also due to Josephina Manifold for her excellent research assistance. All
mistakes and omissions are, of course, my own.
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The Dark Knight, Warner Bros. Pictures, 2008.
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I. INTRODUCTION
New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms, but they are also enabling
unparalleled invasions of privacy.
- Electronic Frontier Foundation2
Not that long ago on a subway train in South Korea, a woman’s dog rather
infamously pooped on the floor of a subway carriage. The woman refused to clean the
mess even after being offered a tissue by a fellow traveler, and the rest is Internet
history.3 Another fellow traveler took photos of her with a cellphone camera. These
photographs were quickly posted on a popular Korean blog. The purpose of the posting
was to shame her.4 Ultimately, the humiliation attached to this incident resulted in a
firestorm of criticism directed at her which caused her to quit her job.5 This story is one
of a number of recent episodes illustrating the way in which a person’s privacy can be
obliterated at the push of a button by the use of the simplest and most ubiquitous
combination of digital technologies – the cellphone camera and the Internet.6 In these
episodes,7 we see a new trend in online conduct: peers intruding into each other’s privacy
with video and, more generally, multi-media, files.8
The phenomenon of online networking, including the sharing of multi-media files,
has recently attracted some media attention,9 particularly because it is an area that is
largely unregulated. Current online privacy regulations focus on the collation and
2

Electronic Frontier Foundation, Privacy, available at http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy, last
viewed on May 12, 2008.
3
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, 211 (2008).
4
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET
(2007) (hereinafter, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION), at 1.
5
ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211.
6
id., at 99 (“One holder of a mobile phone camera can irrevocably compromise someone else’s
privacy …”)
7
id., at 211 (discussion of “Star Wars kid” episode and “Bus Uncle” episode); SOLOVE, THE
FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 43-48 (discussion of “Little Fatty” and “Star Wars Kid”
examples about video-based privacy invasions that potentially harm an individual’s reputation or cause
embarrassment and humiliation).
8
See also Andrew McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through
Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L REV 887, 927 (2006) (“[T]echnology has made it much
easier for people to take embarrassing pictures of others, both with and without consent, and to widely
disseminate them via the Internet.”); 928 (“Digital cameras and camcorders are specifically designed to be
connected to computers and to deliver pictures across worldwide networks in an instant.”); ZITTRAIN, supra
note ___, at 221 (“The central problem [for regulating privacy on the Internet] is that the organizations
creating, maintaining, using, and disseminating records of identifiable personal data are no longer just
“organizations” – they are people who take pictures and stream them online, who blog about their reactions
to a lecture or a class or a meal, and who share on social sites rich descriptions of their friends and
interactions.”)
9
See, for example, Kim Hart, A Flashy Facebook Page at a Cost to Privacy, THE WASHINGTON
POST, June 12, 2008 (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/06/11/AR2008061103759.html, last viewed on July 21, 2008) (discussing privacy
issues with Facebook generally).
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dissemination of text-based digital dossiers comprising personal information,10 rather than
online video images. This is unsurprising, given the fact that the widespread availability
of inexpensive digital video sharing technology is a relatively recent phenomenon.11 It is
now almost trite to say that the Internet poses significant risks to privacy. In the past,
these risks have been characterized as involving the collection, use, and dissemination of
text-based personal information by governments,12 businesses,13 health care providers,14
Internet intermediaries,15 and prospective employers.16 Today, we can add concerns about
unauthorized uses of our personal information by our peers over networks such as
MySpace,17 Facebook,18 Flickr,19 and Youtube.20 Much of this information is in video
form.21

10

See discussion in Part II.A.3 infra.
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARVARD JOURNAL OF
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 5 (2007) (describing some of these new technologies available in the online
world); Bobby White, Cisco Projects Growth to Swell for Online Video, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June
16, 2008, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121358372172676391.html, last viewed on June 16,
2008) (“Cisco Systems Inc. is projecting a sixfold jump in Internet traffic between 2007 and 2012, as online
video becomes the biggest driver of global data communications.”)
12
Professor Solove has, in fact, devoted a large part of a book to these issues: Solove, THE DIGITAL
PERSON, Part III: Government Access (2004) (hereinafter, “THE DIGITAL PERSON”)
13
id., at 4 (“Computers enable marketers to collect detailed dossiers of personal information and to
analyze it to predict the consumer’s behavior. Through various analytic techniques, marketers construct
models of what products particular customers will desire and how to encourage customers to consume.
Companies know how we spend our money, what we do for a living, how much we earn, and where we
live. They know about our ethnic backgrounds, religion, political views, and health problems. Not only do
companies know what we have already purchased, but they also have a good idea about what books we will
soon buy or what movies we will want to see.”)
14
See, for example, Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:
Protecting the Security Of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 331
(2007).
15
See, for example, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy? Proposed Google/Doubleclick
Deal, available at http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ , last viewed on July 21, 2008 (expressing concern
about ability of Internet intermediaries such as search engine Google and Internet advertising firm
Doubleclick to monitor users’ online behavior in the context of proposed merger negotiations between
Google and Doubleclick).
16
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 203 (discussing employers’ practices
with respect to ascertaining and using online information about prospective hires).
17
MySpace is a social networking service where individuals can search for and communicate with
old and new friends: see www.myspace.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008.
18
Facebook describes itself as a “social utility that connects you with the people around you.”:
www.facebook.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008.
19
Flickr describes itself as “almost certainly the best online photo management and sharing
application in the world”: www.flickr.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008.
20
YouTube is an online file sharing service for video files: www.youtube.com, last viewed on July
22, 2008. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 40 (“Anybody can post videos of
anybody else on YouTube. People can post pictures of you or write about you in their blogs. Even if you
aren’t exhibiting your private life online, it may still wind up being exposed by somebody else.”)
21
ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 221 (noting that new threats to privacy online arise from peer based
multimedia content being disseminated on the Internet, as opposed to the traditional threats where
organizations collated text based data about private individuals).
11
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Current online privacy regulations have two things in common. The first is their
predominant focus on text-based records.22 The second is their goal of regulating data in
the hands of institutions that deal with personal information in the course of commercial,
governmental, or professional activities.23 The current regulatory matrix is not aimed at
protecting individuals from peer-based privacy incursions that involve video images.
This regulatory approach made sense when uses of private information on the Internet
were largely confined to text-based compilations of personal information by government
and private enterprises. Now there is a need for new approaches to accommodate
concerns about peer-based intrusions into online privacy, particularly through the
uploading and dissemination of video files. While a picture is worth a thousand words,
an image of an individual in an embarrassing situation might well affect her chances of
employment,24 education, or health insurance25 if widely disseminated online.26
This Article considers the need for a broader approach to online privacy
regulation that takes account of these new developments. It also considers the
appropriate form for such regulation, noting in particular that a traditional “command and
control” regulatory approach27 on its own is unlikely to be particularly effective in this
context. Rather, it suggests a combination of approaches involving multiple regulatory

22

Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 5 (“Much of the legal debate about privacy on the Internet has
previously centered on personally identifiable data, like a person’s address, social security number,
spending habits, and financial information.”).
23
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 13-21 (describing historical growth of
databases in the governmental and commercial context).
24
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 38 (“Employers are looking at social
network site profiles of prospective employees. Microsoft officials admit to trolling the Internet for
anything they can find out about people they are considering for positions.”)
25
For example, a picture of a person smoking, or entering an HIV clinic.
26
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 38 (“Employers are looking at social
network site profiles of prospective employees. Microsoft officials admit to trolling the Internet for
anything they can find out about people they are considering for positions.”) On the other hand, there is
some suggestion that the widespread availability of personal information online cannot be stopped and
might actually be beneficial to society. See, for example, Lior Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an
Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, forthcoming,
October 2008 (arguing that basing decisions on real information rather than dangerous and discriminatory
proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall) (hereinafter, “Reputation Nation”).
27
Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV 313, 320
(2006) (explaining command and control regulatory approach in the environmental context as a
government setting a particular standard with which targeted actors are required to comply).
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modalities, such as legal rules, social norms,28 system architecture,29 market forces,30
public education, and private institutions.31
Part II identifies gaps in current privacy regulations both in the United States and
the European Union with respect to peer-based privacy incursions involving video
technology. Part III suggests the development of new forms of regulation to bridge these
gaps. In so doing, it advocates the interplay32 of a variety of regulatory modalities
including the four modalities of cyberspace regulation identified by Professor Lawrence
Lessig: legal rules, social norms, system architecture, and market forces.33 It further
suggests augmenting these regulatory modalities with new approaches including public
education, and the use of private institutions as regulators. Part IV sets out conclusions
and future directions for the development of online privacy principles. While focused on
digital video content, these observations will also have some application to other forms of
online content including text files and email messages.34 Nevertheless, peer-based video
privacy issues are a powerful and topical case study for putting more general online
privacy concerns into sharp relief.

II. ONLINE VIDEO PRIVACY - GAPS IN THE EXISTING REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
In my mind and in my car, we can't rewind we've gone too far.
Pictures came and broke your heart, put the blame on VTR.

28

Katherine Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57
RUTGERS L REV 1235,1238 (2005) (“Social norms are primarily understood as means to coordinate the
behavior of individuals in a social group. Thus, norms may help to solve coordination problems - by
determining how pedestrians pass one another on the street - and collective action problems - by
stigmatizing littering - when individually rational behavior leads to collectively undesirable results.”)
29
See discussion in Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L REV 553 (1998) (describing how digital technology can be utilized as a
form of regulatory mechanism for online conduct) (hereinafter, “Lex Informatica”).
30
Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIFORNIA LAW REV 1231, 1253 (2001) (“Markets constrain
behavior through price. If the price of gasoline rises dramatically, people will drive less.”)
31
These may be defined as institutions with social benefits, rather than commercial profits, as their
aim. See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEXAS L REV, forthcoming 2008 (describing the American
Libraries Association as a regulatory institution in this sense with respect to the bill of rights it developed to
protect interests of library patrons in 1939) (hereinafter, “Intellectual Privacy”).
32
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, 123 (2004) (noting that the four regulatory modalities he
identifies must, of necessity, interact in practice) (hereinafter, “FREE CULTURE”).
33
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND J ENT L & PRAC 56, 62-63 (1999)
(hereinafter, “The Architecture of Privacy”); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach, 113 HARVARD LAW REV 501, 507 (1999) (identifying the four modalities of cyberspace
regulation: laws, norms, architecture, and markets) (hereinafter, “The Law of the Horse”); LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121-123 (describing the four regulatory modalities and their need to interact
to achieve effective regulation in cyberspace).
34
For a useful consideration of problems related to viral dissemination of emails, see James
Grimmelman, Accidental Privacy Spills, 12 JOURNAL OF INTERNET LAW 3 (2008).
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- The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star”35
Advances in video technologies have historically transformed societies in
dramatic ways. Well before The Buggles sang about the death of radio in the wake of
early video tape-recording technology,36 late nineteenth century commentators expressed
concerns about the development of the “snap camera” by Kodak.37 This was when
photography first became relatively cheap and portable.38 It allowed private individuals
and members of the press to take candid photographs in a manner never before possible.39
It was also what ultimately spurred on Warren and Brandeis to publish their seminal
article on privacy40 that would shape the development of American privacy law for more
than a century.41
The late 1890s was eerily similar to the present day in the sense that individuals
now have a powerful new video capability at their fingertips.42 This time around, the
technology enables us to take candid digital photographs without even having to
remember to carry a camera. The camera now exists in most people’s cellphones.
Additionally, individuals do not require anything more than a network connection to
disseminate those candid images to the world. It is this unbridled distribution capacity
that distinguishes our time from what has gone before. It raises concerns that are not
unlike those posed to copyright law in the digital age by the ability of individual
consumers to share copyrighted works online on a scope and scale never before
possible.43 As with online copyright piracy, the problems for online privacy revolve
around: (a) the threat of viral online distribution of private images44 (“dissemination
35

The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star” (song lyrics), available at
http://www.lyricsondemand.com/onehitwonders/videokilledtheradiostarlyrics.html , last viewed on May
14, 2008.
36
id.
37
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 107-108.
38
id, at 107 (“Kodak’s snap camera was cheap and portable. Many more people could afford to own
their own camera, and for the first time, candid photos of people could be taken.”)
39
Neil Richards and Daniel Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,
96 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 123, 128-9 (2007) (describing Warren and Brandeis’ concern with
the combination of newspaper sensationalism and new photographic technology enabling more widescale
candid photography and dissemination of resulting photographs than ever before) (hereinafter, “Privacy’s
Other Path”); DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Warren and Brandeis were
concerned not only with new [photographic] technology but with how it would intersect with the media.
The press was highly sensationalistic at the time.”) (hereinafter, “UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY”).
40
Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1980).
41
DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Many scholars have proclaimed Warren
and Brandeis’s article the foundation of privacy law in the United States.”); Richards and Solove, Privacy’s
Other Path, supra note ___, at 127-8 (describing Warren and Brandeis’ contribution to the privacy debate
as “Privacy’s Defining Moment” in heading “I”).
42
Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 11-12 (noting that almost 120 years after Warren and Brandeis
published their article, history seems to be repeating itself in terms of a threat to privacy because of the rise
in new communications technologies in cyberspace).
43
Raymond Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital
Technology, 69 U CHI L REV 263 (2002) (identifying the ability of consumers to act as distributors as a
significant change in the copyright paradigm).
44
With respect to the viral distribution of information online generally, see SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 62 (“In the offline world, rarely does gossip hit a tipping point. The
process of spreading information to new people takes time, and friends often associate in similar circles, so
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problems”); (b) the possibility of others augmenting the images with additional
information (true, false, or indeterminate) (“aggregation problems”);45 and, (c) the
inability of the complainant to ever obtain control of the information once it hits
cyberspace (“permanence problems”).46

A. PROTECTING ONLINE PRIVACY: GAPS IN THE CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM
1. Copyright Law
Peer-based video privacy incursions involve images captured by friends and
acquaintances and distributed online, either through closed or open social networks.
Examples of closed networks are online social-networking services (“OSNs”) like
Facebook and MySpace. In these networks, users can control who has access to their
online profiles. Open networks, on the other hand, are generally accessible by anyone
with an Internet connection. A popular example of an open network in this context is
YouTube. It is important to note that, with respect to posted video content, control is
currently generally in the hands of the holder of a given video file. This person will not
necessarily be the subject of the digital image. This situation parallels the way in which
the copyright system works with respect to photographs. Initial copyright in a
photograph is generally granted to the photographer, and not the subject of a
photograph.47 Copyright law is thus not much help to those seeking to assert control over
the dissemination of photographs in which they feature as subjects. Of course, in the
unusual case where the image subject is the owner of copyright in a given image, a
copyright action would be possible for unauthorized distribution of the image online.48

most secrets don’t spread too widely. The Internet takes this phenomenon and puts it on steroids. People
can communicate with tens of thousands – even millions – of people almost simultaneously. If you put
something up on the Internet, countless people can access it at the same time. In an instant, information
can speed across the globe.”)
45
The idea of data aggregation appears as a sub-set of the idea of information processing in
Professor Solove’s “taxonomy of privacy”. See, for example, SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra
note ___, at 118 (“Aggregation is the gathering of information about a person. A piece of information here
or there is not very telling, but when combined, bits and pieces of data begin to form a portrait of a person.
The whole becomes greater than the parts.”) Adding new information to video images might, in some
contexts, resemble a form of identification as also contemplated in Professor Solove’s taxonomy: SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 123 (“Identification is similar to aggregation because both
involve the combination of different pieces of information, one being the identity of a person. However,
identification differs from aggregation in that it entails a link to the person in the flesh.”)
46
McClurg, supra note ___, at 928 (“[P]ersons whose private information is posted on the Internet
permanently lose control over that information and, hence, that aspect of their selves.”); SOLOVE, THE
FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 33 (“The Internet … makes gossip a permanent reputational
stain, one that never fades. It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less
than a second.”); ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (“Lives can be ruined after momentary wrongs, even if
merely misdeameanors.”)
47
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184 (“Copyright in a photo is owned
initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the person whose photo is taken.”)
48
17 U.S.C. § 106 sets out the rights of a copyright holder to prevent unauthorized reproduction,
distribution, and preparation of derivative works based on a copyrighted work. Additionally, where the
image subject is a celebrity, and the image is exploited for commercial profit, a right of publicity action
may be available: ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity
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2. Tort Law – Privacy Torts
Laws regulating intrusive photography are equally unlikely to be of much help to
those concerned about the uploading and online dissemination of images in which they
feature as subjects. While there are some laws that prohibit intruding into another
person’s private space to capture an image of that person,49 the OSN situation will
generally not attract the operation of these laws. Peer photographs are usually taken with
the consent of the subject of the image. In many cases, the subject has no objection to the
taking of the picture, but may later be concerned about viral online dissemination of the
photograph. Laws that regulate intrusive image-capturing, while saying little about
dissemination,50 are not much help to image subjects concerned about uncontrolled online
distribution. Other laws aimed at personal privacy will likewise have little to no
application: for example, the idea of an unauthorized appropriation of a person’s name or
likeness will be of little use in a peer context.51 For one thing, the appropriation is
arguably not unauthorized if the image subject has consented to the taking of the
photograph. For another thing, this tort generally requires an unauthorized commercial
profit motive52 which is generally absent in the context of an OSN.

… is the right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or
other personal characteristics.”) (hereinafter, “GILSON ON TRADEMARKS”)
49
See, for example, California Civil Code, § 1708.8(a) (“A person is liable for physical invasion of
privacy when the defendant knowingly enters onto the land of another person without permission or
otherwise committed a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to
capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in
a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable
person.”)
50
id, § 1708.8 (f) specifically states that dissemination of images taken in contravention of the
earlier provisions of the section is not in and of itself a violation of the section: “Sale, transmission,
publication, broadcast, or use of any image or recording of the type, or under the circumstances, described
in this section shall not itself constitute a violation of this section, nor shall this section be construed to
limit all other rights or remedies of plaintiff in law or equity, including, but not
limited to, the publication of private facts.”
51
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort would
rarely apply to the discussion on the Internet of people’s private lives or the posting of their photos.”)
52
Appropriation actually appears as both a distinct limb of privacy law in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, and as a stand-alone tortious action in a number of American state jurisdictions known variously
as the “right of publicity” or “personality rights tort”. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy.”). For an example of a right of publicity tort, see California Civil Code, §
3344(a) (“Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case
of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by
the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”). Professor Solove notes that appropriation tort law in
general has come to be viewed as protecting valuable property-like interests in an individual’s persona:
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort is often limited to
instances in which a person’s identity is exploited for commercial gain. The tort doesn’t apply when
people’s names or likenesses are used in news, art, literature, and so on.”)

9

REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY
Other branches of privacy law in the United States focus respectively on public
disclosure of private facts53 and on publicity which places a person in a false light in the
eye of the public.54 Both of these require some form of public disclosure55 which may be
missing in a closed social network such as Facebook or MySpace – although distribution
over an open network such as YouTube would be another story. However, even where
there is a public disclosure, it is still an open question whether the distribution of candid
photographs of friends and acquaintances will amount to disclosure of private facts, or
will present a person in a false light. An individual may well object to the dissemination
of an image of her even though the image does not disclose any private facts about her,
and does not present her in a false light for the purposes of the privacy torts.
Can we gain any insights into appropriate regulatory avenues for video privacy by
comparing OSNs to the physical world in which someone might take an unflattering or
embarrassing photograph of a friend, and then show it to others? The photographer has
always presumably been free to show the picture to other friends or family members, and
even to make copies and distribute them to other people. Those other people may well
show the photograph to people outside the immediate social network of the photographer
and the photographic subject. How is this different from what can happen online? The
answer lies in the scope and scale of the potential distribution, including accidental or
incidental distributions to multiple closed and open networks.
Additionally, there is the permanence problem. Online images exhibit a
permanence in multiple people’s hands simultaneously that is largely absent in the
physical world.56 For a friend of a friend to attain a permanent copy of the original
photograph, it is necessary for someone to go to the trouble of physically duplicating the
photograph. Online, however, the uploading of an image to Facebook gives multiple
network participants instantaneous and simultaneous access in multiple geographic
locations.57 The ability to copy and link the photograph to other websites at little to no
cost increases the permanency problem. The practical result of the permanency problem
53

For a discussion of current problems and future directions with this branch of privacy law in the
online context, see Sánchez Abril, supra note ___.
54
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to
the public.”)
55
id, § 652E (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light
in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.”); Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 9-11 (discussing practical difficulties
of individual plaintiffs establishing requisite disclosures of private facts both in the physical world and
online).
56
McClurg, supra note ___, at 928 (“[P]ersons whose private information is posted on the Internet
permanently lose control over that information and, hence, that aspect of their selves.”); SOLOVE, THE
FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 33 (“The Internet … makes gossip a permanent reputational
stain, one that never fades. It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less
than a second.”)
57
Grimmelmann, supra note ___, at 6 (making a similar comparison with contents of an email
message as compared with a handwritten letter in the physical world; Grimmelmann notes that: “People
who wouldn’t have forwarded a letter will forward an email and they’ll forward it to more people.”)
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is that, even if there is an effective regulatory method for an image subject to complain
about online dissemination of an image, there will likely be no effective way to enforce
an order to remove the image. Another troubling corollary of this problem is that
information accessible in multiple locations online is often devoid of the context that it
would have in the physical world.58 This could lead to a greater incidence of
embarrassing and unfair judgments about the subject of a photograph.59

3. Tort Law – Defamation
Obviously, the American privacy torts are of limited application in the OSN
world. Are there other regulatory alternatives? It is possible that defamation law might
be relevant in some cases. However, an image would have to amount to a defamatory
communication for a defamation action. In many cases, an embarrassing or unflattering
image will not be defamatory. Further, defamation law can do little about viral
distributions of personal images, or about the permanence problem. Enforcement of a
defamation order online can be problematic if the information in question exists in
multiple websites and in multiple jurisdictions by the time the order is made.
Additionally, internet intermediaries such as Internet service providers, who serve as
conduits for potentially defamatory content – and are often the easiest potential
defendants to identify – are generally immune from defamation suits online.60

4. Data Protection Law in the European Union
The European Union provides stronger data protection for its citizens than the
United States under the auspices of the European Union Data Protection Directive (“the
Data Protection Directive”)61. However, there are some limitations to the reach of the
Directive in the peer-based video context. The first is that the Directive is generally
limited to conduct occurring within the European Union.62 Thus, the Directive will not
have global reach, subject to certain provisions that extend its operation to information of
58

See, for example, discussion in McClurg, supra note ___, at 926-927 (troubling consequences of
loss of context when information is removed from its original context and revealed widely to strangers);
ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (problems of images being taken out of context online), 226-7 (describing
issues arising from loss of context online and suggestions that hypertext protocols could be reconfigured to
retain context by directing searches to original posting, rather than copies of the posting); 229-230 (loss of
context can lead to blander information exchanges due to concerns about contextualization).
59
id., at 926-927 (troubling consequences of loss of context when information is removed from its
original context and revealed widely to strangers), but see also ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 231 (“To be
sure, contextualization addresses just one slice of the privacy problem, since it only adds information to a
sensitive depiction. If the depiction is embarrassing or humiliating, the opportunity to express that one is
indeed embarrassed or humiliated does not much help.”)
60
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”). See also
discussion in SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 152-153.
61
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data.
62
Most of the articles of the Directive apply to Member States of the European Union. However,
some provisions impact on transfers of data to third countries: See Data Protection Directive, Articles 25
and 26.
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its citizens transmitted to third countries.63 Perhaps more importantly, the Directive was
drafted with the processing of text-based data in mind in the context of business or
governmental dealings with personal information. There may be some question about the
extent to which its provisions would apply to video files distributed by peers on OSNs.
While “personal data” is defined broadly in the Directive as: “any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person”,64 there are two important limitations.
The first is that the Directive covers “information processing activities” which are
conceived in terms that contemplate largely professional, governmental, or commercial
activities involving compilations of individual information. On the other hand,
“processing” is defined broadly to encapsulate: “any operation or set of operations which
is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”.65 Thus, it is possible that the broad
definition of “personal data” could include digital video images and the broad definition
of “processing” could include dissemination of those images over an OSN.
However, the second limitation on the Directive’s operation may be more
problematic. Article 3(2) of the Directive excludes its application from the processing of
personal data: “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity”. Social networking activities might well fall within this category. If that is the
case, they would not be covered by the provisions of the Directive. Of course, the
Directive may apply to the OSNs that provide the forums for online networking, such as
Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr. These services are operating businesses and are not
engaged in purely personal or household activities, even if their customers’ activities
could be described in this way. Thus, an aggrieved plaintiff may have an avenue of
recourse against a social networking site, if not against specific peers who post
unauthorized images on the service.66 Of course, enforcement of any order against an
OSN service could still be problematic. Presumably, the OSN could only remove copies
of a relevant image existing on its own servers and not those that had been distributed
outside. Additionally, even finding all copies within the OSN’s own servers could be
problematic unless the particular image was tagged in some way.67

63

Data Protection Directive, Articles 25 & 26.
id., Article 2(a).
65
id., Article 2(b).
66
Of course, in the United States at least, there is a possibility that actions against online service
providers relating to the posting of information by users of the service would fail because of the operation
of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) which immunizes Internet intermediaries from suit with respect to the speech of
others.
67
Sue Chastain, What is Tagging? Using Keywords for Digital Photo Organization, ABOUT.COM:
GRAPHICS SOFTWARE, available at http://graphicssoft.about.com/od/glossary/a/tagging.htm, last viewed on
July 23, 2008 (“Tags are really nothing more than keywords used to describe a piece of data — be it a web
page, a digital photo, or another type of digital document. Of course, organizing digital images by
keywords and categories has been around for a long time, it just wasn't called "tagging" until fairly
recently.”)
64
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In any event, limitations on a complainant’s ability to bring actions against
particular peers may be appropriate. The ability for individuals to complain about
privacy incursions amongst themselves may have two important advantages over
complaints against online service providers. The first is that it may help to develop social
norms amongst online peers in terms of respecting each other’s privacy. The second is
that it would have less of a dramatic impact on online free speech and technological
innovation than the ability to bring actions against online services providers.
Commentators have expressed concerns in the past about over-broad use of intellectual
property laws online.68 Their concerns are with both the potential chilling of expression69
caused by overzealous enforcement of intellectual property rights online,70 as well as with
the chilling of technological innovation that may ensue if innovators are too readily held
liable for intellectual property infringements committed by their users.71 Actions against
innovators in social networking technologies may have a more adverse impact on online
communications overall than actions involving only private individuals.72
With respect to free speech concerns, there are good arguments that the current
balance between free speech and privacy rights online is weighted too heavily against
privacy.73 Particularly in the context of content created by private individuals about
private individuals intended for closed social networks, it is arguable that calls for free
speech are less powerful than in some other contexts. There is little suggestion that
society will be harmed if individual privacy is better protected over OSNs.74 This may be
68

See, for example, Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody, and
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1327 (2006) (arguing
against the overpropertization of domain names through unbridled application of trademark law); Margreth
Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39
CONN L REV 973 (2007) (discussing the need to balance free speech with trademark interests in the domain
space); Todd Hartman, The Marketplace vs. The Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges to Internet
Commerce, 12 HARV J LAW AND TECH 419 (1999); Neil Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our
System of Free Expression, 53 VAND L REV 1879 (2000); Jack Balkin, A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 NYU L REV 1 (2004).
69
id.
70
id.; LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___.
71
See, for example, Alfred Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W
RES 815, 817-8 (2005) (“If technology providers become responsible for their users’ misbehavior, they will
stop developing and creating for fear of liability, and this will ultimately rob society of the many benefits
that technology brings.”).
72
Congress has recognized this in the case of liability for online defamation and some liability for
online copyright infringement by creating legislative “safe harbors” for intermediary Internet service
providers against liability of their customers for relevant infringements: 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”); 17 U.S.C. § 512 (safe harbor for Internet
service providers against contributory copyright infringement in particular listed circumstances).
73
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 89 (“The interests aligned against privacy
– for example, efficient consumer transactions, free speech, or security – are often defined in terms of their
larger social value. In this way, protecting the privacy of the individual seems extravagant when weighed
against the interests of society as a whole.”) In fact, arguments have been made that protecting privacy
might actually further some of the same interests that free speech protects: SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 129-132.
74
Daniel Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN
DIEGO LAW REVIEW 745, 760-764 (2007) (critiquing conceptions of privacy that pit privacy against free
speech, and noting that society benefits when the value of privacy is not conceptualized within this
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contrasted with situations where a digital image relates to a matter that is actually of
public interest or concern, such as may be the case with an image of a public official in a
comprising situation.
One example of where privacy harms may outweigh free speech concerns in
practice is that relating to a young Canadian student who became known as “Star Wars
Kid” online.75 An embarrassing video file of him playing with a golf ball retriever as if it
was a light saber from the “Star Wars” movies found its way online76 and was
transformed by many Internet users in various ways.77 There may be a free speech
argument that supports this conduct,78 although one might question whether the free
speech advocates for this kind of conduct think the cost justifies the end results. The
young student ended up in psychiatric care for psychological damage related to his online
embarrassment.79 Thus, those who support the status quo, and oppose strengthening
online privacy principles in the name of free speech, should think seriously about the
conduct that can take place over open networks to humiliate and embarrass members of
the very societies whose rights they seek to protect. Indeed, some commentators have
argued that posting personal information about one’s friends and acquaintances is
unlikely to advance free speech interests in many cases.80
Again, these views may support developing privacy regulations that operate
between peers online, rather than impacting online service providers. Perhaps the
obligation should be on peers to respect each other’s privacy online, and regulations
paradigm because individual privacy rights generally bow down before issues perceived as greater social
goods such as free speech under this conception of the free speech versus privacy balance) (hereinafter,
“Nothing to Hide”).
75
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 44-48.
76
id, at 44-45.
77
id, at 46-48.
78
Sánchez Abril, supra note __, at 29-32 (discussing problems of balancing First Amendment
interests with the public disclosure of private facts tort in the online social networks context).
79
Wired News Report, Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, July 24, 2003, WIRED, available at
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757, last viewed on July 23, 2008 (“Ghyslain was
so teased about the video, he dropped out of school and finished the semester at a children's psychiatric
ward, according to a lawsuit filed in the Raza's hometown of Trois-Rivières, Quebec.”); ZITTRAIN, supra
note ___, at 212 (“The student who made the [Star Wars kid] video has been reported to have been
traumatized by its circulation…”). Similar ill fate befell “dog poop girl” in that she was apparently forced
to quit her job as a result of the barrage of online harrassment about the incident involving her dog pooping
on the subway train: ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211. An even more unpleasant fate befell a Hong Kong
bus passenger who later became known on the Internet as “Bus Uncle”: ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211
(“The famed “Bus Uncle” of Hong Kong upbraided a fellow bus passenger who politely asked him to speak
more quietly on his mobile phone. The mobile phone user learned an important lesson in etiquette when a
third person captured the argument and then uploaded it to the Internet, where 1.3 milllion people have
viewed on version of the exchange …. Weeks after the video was posted, the Bus Uncle was beaten up in a
targeted attack at the restaurant where he worked.”)
80
McClurg, supra note ___, at 928-9 (“[L]ittle justification or sociality utility exists in posting
private information about an intimate partner or former partner on the Internet without the person’s
consent. Such information seldom will advance any core interest of free speech, yet can substantially
jeopardize emotional, and even physical, security.”) Of course, Professor McClurg was limiting his
comments to intimate partner’s in romantic relationships, but this principle holds true more generally with
respect to friends and acquaintances.
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should enforce these norms, rather than inhibiting the development of technologies that
foster communication, such as OSNs. At least, there should be a balance between
regulations that directly impact OSNs and those that operate between online peers.
Remember, here, that the term “regulation” is being used broadly in this article to
encompass laws, norms, market forces, system architecture, educational initiatives, and
private institutions.
It is also important to acknowledge that advocating more individual privacy
protection online is not necessarily advocating absolute protection to the extent that
speech and communication are impossible. Rather, it is suggesting the development of
some principles that would ensure that a video subject has some say in the dissemination
of digital images in situations where it is reasonable to expect that the individual should
be able to assert some control. Would this create a legal property right in a person’s
image?81 Not necessarily. It would depend on how the control mechanism was framed.
In particular, it would depend on the interplay between the various regulatory modalities
identified above. Property rights are largely the creature of laws82 and markets,83 whereas
norms and other regulatory modalities may not rely so heavily on notions of property.

B. LIMITATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
Another current possibility for regulating online video privacy might be derived
from the terms of use of OSNs and other online networks over which images may be
disseminated. However, as with legal regulation, there are serious gaps and problems in
relying on the current state of these terms of use. OSNs vary in the extent to which they
impose terms on their users to respect others’ privacy. Online services such as YouTube
and Flickr, for example, allow large scale public dissemination of video information with
little attempt at confidentiality. The operators of these services exercise some control
over contents,84 but rely heavily on their users to self-police.85 Yahoo’s terms of use, for

81

SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 24-29 (critiquing property theory of
privacy rights).
82
Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 520 (“The government could declare that
information about individuals obtained through a computer network is owned by the individuals; others
could take that information, and use it, only with the consent of those individuals.”)
83
See, for example, Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 393, 397
(1978) (“That disclosure of personal information is resisted by, i.e., is costly to, the person to whom the
information pertains yet is valuable to others may seem to argue for giving people property rights in
information about themselves and letting them sell those rights freely. The process of voluntary exchange
would then assure that the information was put to its most valuable use.”)
84
See, for example, clause 7.B. of YouTube’s Terms of Use: “YouTube reserves the right to decide
whether Content or a User Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for
violations other than copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a
User's access for uploading such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior
notice and at its sole discretion.” (available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on May 14, 2008).
However, note that some commentators have suggested that many of these policies are not actually
enforced in practice: Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 14, fn 84 (noting that there is little to no apparent
enforcement of MySpace’s terms of use as an example of lack of effective policing by online social
network services providers).
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example, which are expressly incorporated into agreements to use Flickr, provide that
each subscriber agrees not to use the online service to: “upload, post, email, transmit or
otherwise make available any Content that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive,
harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous, invasive of another's privacy,
hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable”.86 YouTube’s Terms of Use
provide that: “In connection with User Submissions, you … agree that you will not
submit material that is copyrighted, protected by trade secret or otherwise subject to third
party proprietary rights, including privacy and publicity rights, unless you are the owner
of such rights or have permission from their rightful owner to post the material ….”.87
Some closed networks such as Facebook incorporate more strongly worded
privacy protections into their terms of use. Not only does Facebook include a clause very
similar to the above terms from the Yahoo and YouTube terms of use,88 it also requests
that its subscribers not use the service to: “upload, post, transmit, share, store or
otherwise make available any videos other than those of a personal nature that: (i) are of
you or your friends, (ii) are taken by you or your friends, or (iii) are original art or
animation created by you or your friends.”89 Facebook also provides its users with a set
of Privacy Principles organized around two “core principles”, the second of which states
that: “There is an increasing amount of information available out there, and you may
want to know what relates to you, your friends, and people around you. We want to help
you easily get that information.”90 Additionally, Facebook’s terms of use provide that:
“You may not post, transmit, or share User Content on the Site or Service that you did
not create or that you do not have permission to post.”91
One limitation of these principles and policies is the extent to which they are
legally enforceable. Even if these provisions do effectively become part of a user’s
contract with a relevant network,92 the actual complainant about a privacy incursion is not
a party to that contract. Thus, the victim of a privacy breach may not have standing to
bring an action under the OSN’s terms of use. Further, there is a definitional question as
85

See, for example, clause 6 of Yahoo’s Terms of Use relating to “Member Conduct”, available at
info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008; clause 6 of YouTube’s
Terms of Use relating to “User Submissions and Conduct”, available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last
viewed on May 14, 2008.
86
Yahoo’s Terms of Use, clause 6(a), available at info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008 (emphasis added).
87
YouTube’s Terms of Use, clause 6.D., available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on
May 14, 2008 (emphasis added).
88
Facebook’s Terms of Use, “User Conduct” clause, available at
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008.
89
id. See also Facebook’s Code of Conduct, available at
http://www.facebook.com/codeofconduct.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008.
90
Facebook Principles, available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php, last viewed on May 14,
2008.
91
Facebook Terms of Use, Clause on “User Content Posted on the Site”, available at
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008.
92
For example, if the terms are presented in a manner where the user has to affirmatively assent to
be bound by the terms, and if some meaningful consideration can be found to support the contract: Specht
v Netscape Communications Corp, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 306 F. 3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002)
(describing application of these contract law principles to online contractin).
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to how to interpret a clause providing that a subscriber will not engage in conduct that is
invasive of another person’s privacy. There is no clear legal definition of conduct that is
invasive of another’s privacy in this context. Thus, any interpretation of such a clause
would have to fall back on social norms.
This is not an insurmountable problem, but it does suggest that social norms will
play a central role in resolving these kinds of disputes in the future: for example, one
might argue that clauses prohibiting conduct that is “unlawful or invasive of another’s
privacy” suggest that the reference to privacy infringement is outside of, and separate
from, purely legal conceptions of privacy. Otherwise, the policies would be drafted
differently. If privacy within the policies was intended to connote purely legal privacy
rights, arguably the policy would say something like: “users will not upload or transmit
content that is unlawful in any way, including content that infringes another person’s
privacy rights”. Juxtaposing privacy invasions with legal rights in the way that some
current clauses are drafted could be regarded as a contractual attempt to enforce both
legal rights and social norms relating to privacy.
With respect to clauses such as Facebook’s requirement that a subscriber must
only post material that she created or had permission to post, there is no definition of
what constitutes “permission to post”. In particular, there is no guidance as to whose
permission must be obtained for the posting of what information: for example, if I take a
group photograph of my high school class, do I have to obtain the whole classes’
permission to post the photograph? What form does that permission have to take? If I
simply ask my classmates at the time of taking the photo whether anyone minds if I post
the photo on my Facebook page, and no one expressly objects, would that constitute
permission? What if I take a photograph or video in a crowded mall that includes people
I know and people I don’t know? Do I need to obtain permission from all the
photographic subjects to post the photograph online? What if I take a video of two otters
swimming side by side – for some reason a popular YouTube contribution.93 Whose
permission do I need, if any, to show this video online? The zookeeper’s? Any
bystanders who may appear in the picture? What if one of the bystanders is doing
something embarrassing, such as picking her nose or adjusting her underwear? What if
one of the bystanders is kissing or holding hands with a homosexual partner, and it turns
out that the person is not openly gay? Do I owe any greater concern for their privacy
because of the potential discomfort, embarrassment or harm it might cause them to have
people see this conduct online?
With respect to the “permission to post” requirement, it is likely that the drafting
intention behind this clause was to capture permission of those with proprietary interests
in relevant content, such as copyrights or trademarks. It seems perfectly reasonable to
require me to obtain copyright permission to post something, like a movie clip, that might
otherwise infringe copyright. However, privacy rights work differently – if at all – in this

93

YouTube, “Otters Holding Hands” (available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epUk3T2Kfno, last viewed on July 23, 2008).
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context. Some commentators have suggested that privacy should be treated as an
intangible property right of some kind,94 but there is little consensus on this point.95
YouTube’s “permission to post” requirement is more closely linked to the concept
of privacy rights than Facebook’s requirement. YouTube requires that users agree not to
submit any material that is subject to third party proprietary rights “including privacy and
publicity rights” unless the user owns the relevant rights or has permission from the
rights-holder to post the material.96 Here, a privacy right is included in the concept of a
property right. As noted above, this may or may not be a legally accurate conception of
privacy. The privacy right is also linked with the notion of publicity rights in the
YouTube clause. Publicity rights generally are treated as property rights, even though
this theoretical justification for the rights has been criticized.97 The linkage between
privacy and publicity rights is a historical one. Publicity rights are generally regarded as
having been born out of gaps left by the Warren and Brandeis conception of privacy98 as
applied to celebrities and public figures. Celebrities and public figures had a difficult

94

SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of
privacy); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan L Rev 1283, 1288-1294
(2000) (describing various theories of private information as property).
95
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 27 (“Extending property concepts to
personal information … has difficulties. Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by others,
cannot be eradicated from their minds. Unlike physical objects, information can be possessed
simultaneously within the minds of millions. This is why intellectual-property law protects particular
tangible expressions of ideas rather than the underlying ideas themselves. The complexity of personal
information is that it is both an expression of the self and a set of facts – a historical record of one’s
behavior.”); Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295 (“Whether or not it could be easily implemented, a
privacy-as-property solution carries with it some serious disadvantages. Our society has a longstanding
commitment to freedom of expression. Property rights in any sort of information raise significant policy
and free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks: building blocks of expression; of self-government;
and of knowledge itself. When we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which that fact may be put.
That notion is radical. It is also inconsistent with much of our current First Amendment jurisprudence.
Thus, the idea of creating property rights in personal data raises fundamental constitutional issues. If it
looked likely that a property rights model would prove to be an effective tool for protecting personal data
privacy, it might be worthwhile to balance the privacy and free speech interests to see which one weighed
more. [H]owever, a property rights model would be ineffective in protecting data privacy. It would, in all
likelihood, make the problem worse.”); Posner, supra note ___, at 397-401 (critiquing theories that favour
personal property rights in private information).
96
Clause 6.D., YouTube’s Terms of Use (available at http://www.youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed
on July 23, 2008).
97
See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace: A Personality Rights Paradigm for
Personal Domain Name Disputes, WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW, forthcoming, 2008.
98
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 15 (“In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis penned their famous article, “The Right to Privacy,” arguing for the legal recognition of a right to
privacy, which they defined as a “right to be let alone.”) It should be noted that the Warren and Brandeis
conception of privacy actually drew from previous work by Thomas Cooley: Ruth Gavison, Privacy and
the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE LAW JOURNAL 421, 437, and n.48 (1980) (noting that the concept of privacy
as the “right to be let alone” is often incorrectly attributed to Warren and Brandeis, when it was actually
first advanced by Cooley in T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed 1888); see also Diane Zimmerman,
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L REV 291,
292 and n.2 (1983).
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time convincing courts that defendants had intruded into their seclusion and infringed on
their “right to be let alone”, having actively sought the public eye for their livelihoods.99
Publicity rights were born to guard against unauthorized commercial exploitations
of celebrities’ names and likenesses.100 The continuing linkage between privacy and
publicity rights potentially connotes a property right in both contexts. Therefore, the
drafting of YouTube’s “permission to post” clause is problematic in that it implicitly
requires a property right in private information as the basis for a complaint. As noted in
the preceding paragraphs, it is not universally accepted that individuals have property
rights in their own personal information.101 Even those who think that individuals do – or
should – own their personal information online have generally considered this question
with respect to text-based data, rather than visual images.102
Images are qualitatively different in that they contain both more, and less,
information about an individual. They capture something candid about the individual at a
given moment in time.103 Text-based data on the other hand, is iterative. The concerns
about use of text-based data online have been about the way in which it can be
99
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aggregated over a period of time to build up a detailed profile of a person.104 It may take
a whole collection of text-based data to suggest something that a picture candidly
demonstrates in one digital file: for example, an aggregated text-based profile may
include elements that suggest a person is trying to become pregnant. These records may
include purchasing records and medical records involving purchase of ovulation tests,
pregnancy tests, information on pregnancy, information on in vitro fertilization (“IVF”),
and medical appointments with fertility specialists. However, a video image of the
person entering an IVF clinic could tell the story in one glance.
Peer-based images are also qualitatively different from text in that they are likely
to arise out of a relationship between the image subject and the photographer. This may
suggest that both parties have rights to information contained in the image because they
were both parties to a shared experience that led to the taking of the photograph. For
example, a photograph at a given social event is a record of a shared experience between
the photographer and the photographic subject. When information arises from
relationships, and implicates joint interests in control of the information, the regulation of
the dissemination of that information is more problematic than in situations where
information purely pertains to one individual.105 Of course, one could argue that much
online text-based information also arises from a relationship – that of the relationship
between the data subject and the organization with which the subject transacted.
However, the information in the text-based data aggregation context is more likely to
consist of discrete facts pertaining to the data subject106 than the information contained in
a photograph of a shared experience between two peers.
This discussion has so far not touched upon the question of the standing of a
photographic or video subject to bring a complaint under an OSN’s terms of use. Even if
that person can establish a sufficient legal interest in her image to satisfy the “permission
to post” aspect of, say, YouTube’s terms of use, her recourse would be to complain to
YouTube that the subscriber had infringed her rights. It would be up to YouTube to
decide whether the complaint had any merit, and whether to take any commensurate
action against the subscriber, such as removing the posting, or barring the subscriber
from the system.107
There are further limitations with relying on OSNs’ terms of use to protect
privacy. Even Facebook’s requirement that users limit their postings to photographs of
themselves and their friends, or photographs taken by themselves or their friends, is open
to interpretation. On a closed network like Facebook, the term “friends” means
104
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something qualitatively different to the way in which we conceptualize a friend in the
physical world.108 In the physical world, we know whether or not we are acquainted with
a particular person. We may or may not know the person well, and we may even have
forgotten the person’s name. However, we are unlikely to consider someone a friend or
acquaintance if we have never met them.
This is quite different online. A “friend” on Facebook is anyone who has given
you permission to join their online network of “friends”, whether or not they have ever
met you in person.109 Although Facebook contemplates that its subscribers will use the
service to find people online who they already know in the real world,110 there is no way
to ensure that this is the case in practice. It is easy to make relatively anonymous online
contacts on Facebook, and for those contacts to quickly be considered “friends”. These
contacts will increase the potential recipients of information on a subscriber’s site to
many people who the subscriber, and the subject of any information on the subscriber’s
website, may not actually know. Of course, the practical problems can potentially be
greater on an open network that does not even attempt to limit dissemination of
information to online “friends”. However, the point here is that “friends” in a closed
network’s terms of use may be a deceptively comforting concept for those concerned
about online privacy.

III. SIX MODALITIES FOR VIDEO PRIVACY REGULATION
The problem of protecting privacy in cyberspace comes in part from an architecture that
enables the collection of data without the user's consent. But the problem also comes
from a background regime of entitlement that does not demand that the collector obtain
the user's consent. Because the user has no property interest in personal information,
information about the user is free for the taking.
- Professor Lawrence Lessig
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digital age advances, these challenges are global in nature. As with cyberlaw more
generally, we need to consider whether we are confronting the need for new regulatory
approaches, or rather of simply expanding the application of current regulatory structures.
In this context, it is important to appreciate that there is more than one possible regulatory
modality for online conduct. Legal rules are not the only solution. 112
In the early days of Internet governance debates, Professor Lawrence Lessig
recognized four distinct regulatory modalities that would be useful in cyberspace.113 They
included legal rules, which Professor Lessig defined as rules that constrain our behavior
by threatening punishment if we do not obey.114 He then identified three other forms of
regulation that are found in real space and that may be applied in cyberspace: social
norms,115 markets,116 and architecture.117 Social norms are similar to legal rules in that they
threaten punishment for disobedience.118 However, they differ in that the punishment is
imposed by community, rather than government.119 Markets regulate by imposing price
constraints on certain behaviors.120 In the privacy context in particular, Professor Lessig
noted that one example of market forces as regulator is where firms are able to charge
more to consumers if they provide greater assurances of personal privacy.121 Architecture
regulates by physically constraining certain types of behavior.122 In the real world, for
example, the erection of a border fence may constrain illegal immigration.123 The
112
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cyberspace analog to physical world architecture is system architecture or “code”.124
According to Professor Lessig, this encompasses both the hardware and software aspects
of an information technology system.125 In the privacy context, Professor Lessig has
suggested that encryption technology is an example of system architecture that could
some way towards protecting online privacy.126
Professor Lessig further observed that none of the four modalities of regulation
operates in a vacuum. They all rely on each other to some extent.127 It is the interaction
of the regulatory modalities that facilitates a given behavior in both direct and indirect
ways.128 Professor Lessig’s account of regulatory modalities is very apt when one
considers the regulation of digital video privacy amongst peer networks. No one
modality effectively protects individual privacy in video images to the extent we might
desire. Even the current interplay between these modalities arguably does not achieve
that result. This article argues that we could more effectively identify and develop
aspects of these, and other, regulatory modalities, as well as potential interactions
between them, in ways that might better protect privacy online. In this context, it
suggests the recognition of two additional regulatory modalities in the OSN context: (a)
public education,129 and, (d) private institutions.130 Private institutions might comprise
OSNs themselves, but perhaps more to the point, public interest organizations like the
Electronic Frontier Foundation131 (“EFF”) and the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(“EPIC”).132 The identification of new forms of regulatory modality is not inconsistent
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with Professor Lessig’s work – he did not intend for his four regulatory modalities to be
the last word on cyberspace regulation.133
The remainder of this Part identifies the key features of each of these six
regulatory modalities and how they might be usefully applied in practice to create more
effective protections for online privacy. In so doing, it necessarily considers the potential
interactions between the six modalities, as it is unlikely that any one or more of these
modes of regulation, operating alone, could achieve an appropriate balance of interests
involving video privacy.134 Before turning to the individual modes of regulation, it is
worth first touching on the necessity of characterizing a video privacy right as either a
form of property right or something else. As some of the regulatory modalities identified
here, such as market forces, are often regarded as necessitating property interests for the
efficient operation of markets,135 it is important to establish the contours of video privacy
rights in terms of whether or not that are, or need be, classified as a form of property.

B. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION?
One issue that has plagued privacy law has been uncertainty about whether
individuals have – or should have – a property right in their personal information.136 If
such a property right is to be recognized, what form should it take? Some commentators
have assumed that, absent a governmentally recognized property right in personal
information, there is scant policy justification for enacting new laws to protect online
privacy.137 Professor Lessig, for example, has argued that the creation of a property right
in personal information would be a matter for government.138 Once governmentally
established, the right would be instrumental in regulating unauthorized uses of personal
information in terms of familiar civil and criminal law concepts such as misappropriation
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and theft.139 It would also facilitate private negotiations between parties about uses of
personal data.140
While governments can undoubtedly regulate personal information as a property
right, there is a question as to whether they should. Property rights in information have
always been contentious.141 They create concerns about chilling speech.142 Governments
who create property rights in information therefore must act to preserve the balance
between those rights and speech. This is a difficult task and is not always successfully
achieved in practice.143 In a federal system, the propertization of information can raise
constitutional questions about which level of government has legislative competence to
enact relevant laws. If the state governments are the appropriate bodies to undertake this
task, problems arise as to interstate harmonization of law, particularly where information
transcends state, and even national, borders at the press of a button.144
In any event, none of this gets to the underlying question of a policy justification
for treating private information as property. It is tempting to accept that if something has
value, as private information potentially does - depending on the context and how value
is defined145 - it should be treated as property. The problem with this reasoning in the
context of the present discussion is that much of the economic value in online
information to date has been in text records in the hands of data aggregators.146 While
there may be good arguments for creating property rights in compilations and databases
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in the hands of data aggregators,147 it is not necessarily true that personal information in
the hands of the individual to whom it relates is a valuable commodity in terms that
justify a property right.148
Even where information in a video format is aggregated in forums like OSNs,
there is little theoretical justification for granting a property right to either the data subject
or the person who controls the photograph.149 This is because the private individuals
networking over OSNs are not likely doing so for commercial purposes that would justify
or necessitate a property right either in data about them or in data about others that
appears on their personal webpages. There may be a justification for importing a
property right to the provider of an OSN in respect of its meta-collection of data. This is
because the OSN operators might argue that they do utilize this data for commercial
purposes. However, even that argument is tenuous in situations where an OSN does not
transact with the data per se, but rather utilize their vast collection of users as an
incentive to attract advertisers.150
Of course, not all property rights are justified on the basis of economic value.
Many theoretical conceptions of property do not require economic value as a necessary
element, and some commentators have argued that just because something has a
commercial value does not mean that it automatically merits a property label.151 While
value and property are often aligned, it is not necessarily the case that something must be
commercially valuable to be property or that something must be property if it has a
commercial value. An old dog-eared copy of a Shakespeare play, for example, may no
longer have any real economic value, but it will still be property. On the other hand, a
person’s time may be valuable, but it will not necessarily be property.
Even traditional property rights may be characterized by things other than
commercial value. These things might comprise the ability to exclude others, the ability
to enjoy an item free from interference, or the ability to alienate or transfer rights in the
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item whether or not for commercial value.152 These typical proprietary attributes are
generally missing from personal information. It would be very difficult for any
individual to meaningfully function in society, particularly online, without leaving
footprints involving disclosures of personal information. Thus, there is no meaningful
way of excluding others from personal information or to enjoy the information free from
interference. Sometimes information is required by others, as by contract, to complete a
purchase.153 Other times the information is incidentally observed as part of functioning in
society: for example, if you go to the shops, people will see what you look like, an image
of you may be captured on a security camera in a department store, etc.154 Online,
individuals constantly leave digital footprints involving this kind of information.155
Of course, advocates of property rights in personal information may well argue
that it is these very aspects of personal privacy that require a property label. The
necessity of transacting with personal information on a day to day basis requires that the
individual be entitled to bargain for value for exchanges involving this information.156
However, this is a circular argument. It assumes that something should be labeled
property because individuals are effectively forced to disclose it and therefore they
should be compensated for doing so. This might be justified on the basis of some kind of
unjust enrichment theory. In other words, data aggregating businesses are unjustly
enriched by individuals if they can put together valuable consumer profiles using
information “belonging to” others without compensating them for it.
However, unjust enrichment actions are not of necessity based on the
identification of a property right in the plaintiff.157 Thus, an unjust enrichment analysis
does not necessarily resolve the privacy-as-property question. Additionally, the unjust
enrichment solution would also suffer from the fact that restitution law has an uncertain
theoretical basis.158 Unjust enrichment may be an equally unstable basis for protecting
privacy interests as property theory. Outside of property and restitution theory, there may
be arguments based on autonomy and personhood for granting legal rights in personal
privacy.159 In the context of attempting to explain the philosophical underpinnings of the
152
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right of publicity, which is derived from the right to privacy, various commentators have
suggested basing such rights in notions of autonomy and personhood.160 This is a
possibility, but again, the theoretical contours of a right of personhood are unclear,161 and
the theory may not be any more useful than trying to pin down a privacy right as a form
of property.
One question that might be worth posing at this point is whether it is actually
necessary to create one single philosophical underpinning for online privacy rights, at
least at this very moment.162 This is clearly a time when individuals feel that they are
being harmed, to a greater or lesser extent, by much online conduct that interferes with
their ability to control their own personas in cyberspace.163 Nevertheless, there is
currently little consensus within academia or legal practice as to the nature and scope of
individual privacy rights. It may be that the legal label ultimately attached to privacy
rights, and the philosophical underpinnings justifying that label, need to be developed in
the future as the contours of the rights develop over time.164
In other words, it may be that the various regulatory modalities for information
privacy need a chance to work together over time ultimately to create a situation where it
is easier to identify the legal nature of, and philosophical justification for, distinct online
privacy rights. It may be that for the time being, all we need to do is think about privacy
rights in terms of some form of control mechanism relating to the permitted accesses and
uses of personal information online.165 Obviously, this mechanism needs to be balanced
against other interests including free speech and, probably to some extent, intellectual
property law.166
related to protecting the individual’s personal dignity); Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 7-8 (“[O]thers
have defined privacy in terms of personhood, intimacy, and secrecy.”); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 29-34 (critiquing “personhood” theories of privacy).
160
See discussion in Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at ___.
161
In the right of publicity context, see, for example, discussion in Mark McKenna, The Right of
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225 (2005); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?
The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 383 (1999).
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In fact, this is arguably the approach taken by Professor Solove who prefers taking a “bottom-up”
approach to identifying and resolving related privacy problems as the basis for his taxonomy of privacy,
rather than identifying one overarching theoretical principle to explain privacy rights: SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 105 (“My taxonomy’s categories are not based upon any
overarching principle. We do not need overarching principles to understand and recognize problems …. If
we focus on the problems, we can better understand and address them. I aim to shift the approach to a
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163
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___ (the text is replete with examples of ways
in which individuals and their reputations are being harmed by online conduct).
164
Solove, Nothing to Hide, supra note ___, at 759-760 (noting that it might be worth taking an
approach that focuses on solving practical problems of privacy rather than spending too much attention
trying to discern a perfect theoretical basis for the concept of privacy).
165
See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OREGON
LAW REVIEW 695 (2003).
166
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 87 (“We live in an “age of balancing,” and
the prevailing view is that most rights and liberties are not absolute. Because privacy conflicts with other
fundamental values, such as free speech, security, curiosity, and transparency, we should engage in a
candid and direct analysis of why privacy interests are important and how they ought to be reconciled with
other interests. We cannot ascribe a value to privacy in the abstract.”)
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This approach is not as foreign as it might seem. Most intangible property rights
developed organically as societal and economic needs arose. Trademarks, for example,
arose initially to address needs of the commercial community to guard against unfair
competition practices relating to false or misleading branding of goods and services.167
There is still some international disagreement as to whether trademarks are appropriately
characterized as property rights.168 Nevertheless, domestic trademark laws are still able to
function despite the lack of consensus as to the underlying theoretical explanation of a
trademark. Trade secrets are another case in point where theoretical justifications for the
rights are somewhat varied both within and between jurisdictions.169 Nevertheless, the
system is able to function in practice.
Even Internet domain names have an uncertain legal status as property. In some
contexts they have been regarded as a form of intangible personal property,170 whilst in
others they are regarded as a pure contractual license.171 Nevertheless, the domain name
system continues to function, while market forces, social norms, and judicial decisions
iron out the underlying philosophical creases. Indeed, Professor Solove, one of this era’s
leading privacy theorists, advocates a bottom up, problem-solving approach to theorizing
privacy in the digital age.172 His views reflect that fact that privacy problems in this era
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LEXIS, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION DESKBOOK, § 1.01.
Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687,
1693-1694 (1999) (noting in the context of United States law that it is very difficult to find a rationale to
treat trademarks as a form of property). This may be compared with jurisdictions like the United Kingdom
and Australia where trademarks are explicitly defined as a form of personal property in the relevant
legislation: Trade Marks Act, U.K. § 2(1) (1994) (“A registered trade mark is a property right obtained by
the registration of the trade mark under this Act and the proprietor of a registered mark has the rights and
remedies provided by this Act.”); Trade Marks Act, Austl., § 21(1) (1995) (specifically defining a “trade
mark” as a personal property right).
169
Jacqueline Lipton, Protecting Valuable Commercial Information in the Digital Age: Law, Policy,
and Practice, 6 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW AND POLICY 1, 9-15 (2001) (comparing the theoretical
treatment of trade secrets in different jurisdictions, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) (full text available at: http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol6/issue1/lipton.html, last viewed on
July 24, 2008).
170
Kremen v Cohen, 337 F. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (domain names treated as property for the
purposes of California’s conversion law); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (allowing in rem proceedings against
domain names as property in certain circumstances).
171
Network Solutions, Inc v Umbro International Inc, 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000) (domain names not
regarded as a new form of property for the purpose of garnishment proceedings).
172
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note ___, at 1129 (“[T]his Article advances as
“approach” to understanding privacy rather than a definition or formula for privacy. It is an approach
because it does not describe the sum and substance of privacy but provides guidance in identifying,
analyzing, and ascribing value to a set of related dimensions of practices. An approach to conceptualizing
privacy should aid in solving problems, assessing costs and benefits, and structuring social relationships.
My approach is from the bottom up rather than the top down because it conceptualizes privacy within
particular contexts rather than in the abstract.”)
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require a pragmatic approach173 based on solving particular problems,174 acknowledging
their differences, while at the same time recognizing their similarities.175

C. LEGAL RULES AS PRIVACY REGULATOR
1. The Role of Legal Regulation Online
Lawyers have a tendency to regard legal rules as the paramount – and sometimes
the only – solution to a given problem.176 This is not surprising, given our training.
Professor Lessig has described legal rules as: “rules that constrain our behavior by
threatening punishment if we do not obey.”177 He also notes that the law threatens
punishment after the fact for failure to comply with pre-set rules.178 Laws have limits as a
regulatory modality, especially online. In particular, an effective enforcement
mechanism has to be created to ensure that laws are appropriately enforced. This does
not mean one hundred percent enforcement, but at least sufficient enforcement – or threat
of enforcement – to constrain the behavior of individuals to comport legal rules. This is
difficult in the online context. Enforcement can be problematic where many online actors
are anonymous, or are situated in different jurisdictions. Identifying potential defendants,
and enforcing laws against them can be very tricky in cyberspace. These problems can
also involve significant costs to potential plaintiffs or government agencies seeking to
bring action against alleged online wrongdoers.
Governments also often need to make difficult policy choices in enacting new
laws, particularly where those laws seek to balance competing interests such as privacy,
speech, and property rights. The novelty of much online conduct exacerbates the
difficulties for governments in identifying appropriate policies on which to base legal
regulation. Governments often look to social norms to discern an appropriate policy
basis for new laws. In areas like online social networking, where many social norms are
not fully developed, governments will have difficulty identifying appropriate policy
justifications and balances for new laws.
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SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 87-88 (describing pragmatic approach to
privacy theory).
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id, at 75 (“I contend that the focal point for a theory of privacy should be the problems we want
the law to address.”)
175
Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U PA L REV 477, 486-7 (2006) (“The taxonomy [of
privacy] demonstrates that there are connections between different harms and problems. It is no accident
that various problems are referred to as privacy violations; they bear substantial similarities to each other.
But we also must recognize where they diverge. The goal is to define more precisely what the problem is
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of privacy problems.”).
176
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121 (“Law is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers at
least).”)
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Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 507 (“Law … orders people to behave in certain
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178
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121 (“[L]aw constrains by threatening punishment
after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated.”).
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Legal rules are therefore unlikely to be the stand-alone answer to privacy
problems involving online video dissemination. Laws will have some place, likely an
important place,179 in the overall regulatory matrix, but they cannot solve online privacy
problems on their own. The challenge for regulators is to identify exactly what role legal
rules should play in relation to online video privacy issues, and how those rules should
interact with other forms of regulation. Recently, commentators have made some
suggestions along these lines. Professor Solove suggests that even though legal
regulation will not be the complete answer to our online privacy problems,180 online
privacy regulation could be bolstered by the law: (a) recognizing privacy in public;181 (b)
better protecting confidential relationships;182 and, (c) allowing individuals to exercise
greater control over their personal information after it has been exposed to other people
or even to the general public.183
There are, in fact, a number of specific areas in which laws might be enacted,
modified or strengthened to assist in combating online privacy incursions in the situations
under consideration in this article. They include: (a) torts protecting rights of privacy and
publicity; (b) legislation promoting codes of conduct and technical standards for
protecting privacy; and, (c) contracts and breach of confidence actions. Additionally,
there are models for laws regulating information that could usefully be adapted to address
privacy interests online. In this context, privacy law might draw some inspiration from
lessons learned previously in digital copyright law and environmental regulation.

2. Lessons from Digital Copyright Law
Professor Solove has noted some of the parallels between the regulation of online
privacy and the regulation of copyright online.184 In particular, he identifies ways in
which copyright law has managed to effectively protect copyrights in online video,
despite early concerns about the ability of rights holders to exercise control over digital
information.185 He uses the example of digital copyright law to answer those who suggest
that it is impossible to regulate privacy online because it is too difficult to obtain effective
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id, at 123 (“While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role in
affecting the three. The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a
particular modality.”)
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SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 193 (“There is … a limit to how much
the law can do. The law is an instrument capable of subtle notes, but it is not quite a violin.”)
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id, at 187. Professor Sánchez Abril has also noted that, while many traditional privacy laws are
premised on a distinction between public and private conduct, this distinction has become increasingly
blurred in the digital information age, which has caused expectations of privacy to become unstable and
difficult to ascertain: Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 5-6. See also ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 212
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the kind of privacy we might want [online].”), 216 (“Peer-leveraging technologies are overstepping the
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SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 187. See Richards and Solove, Privacy’s
Other Path, supra note ___.
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id, at 188.
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id, at 185.
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id, at 184-186.
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control over digital information.186 He notes that copyright law applies online regardless
of whether information has been accidentally exposed to the public or not,187 and even if it
is in a digital format that can be readily copied.188 His point is that the copyright example
proves that legal rules can control information online, including digital video information
that is easy to reproduce and disseminate at the push of a button.
In fact, there are many similarities between online privacy regulation and digital
copyright regulation. Common issues include: (a) how to effectively control access to,
and use of, digitally available information; (b) how to balance the rights of an
information rights holder against competing interests such as free speech189 and other
legitimate uses;190 (c) what kinds of liability, if any, should be faced by Internet
intermediaries, such as Internet service providers, for unauthorized activities of others;191
(d) identifying appropriate forums for dispute resolution in a global information society;
(e) dealing with global disharmonization of relevant legal principles;192 (f) identifying
wrongdoers in a largely anonymous online medium;193 and, (g) providing remedies for
viral online dissemination of protected information.194 Thus, copyright law may prove a
186

id., at 184 ([I]s control over information really feasible? If we expose information to others, isn’t
it too difficult for the law to allow us still to control it? Perhaps the law is reticent about granting control
because of the practical difficulties. Information spreads rapidly, sometimes like a virus, and it is not easily
contained.”)
187
id, at 185 (“The copyright system focuses on the use of information – it allows certain uses and
prohibits others. And it does so regardless of whether the information has been publicly exposed.”)
188
id. (“[C]opyright law provides protection even when a work can be readily copied. I don’t have to
take any steps to protect my work.”)
189
In fact, Professor Solove notes that copyright protections have proved so strong online that even
First Amendment concerns yield before copyright: SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___,
at 186.
190
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unauthorized privacy invasions are implemented. See, for example, Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
(upholding law requiring computerized data aggregation of information relating to prescription of certain
medications, and acknowledging that appropriate information security safeguards were in place).
191
Professor Solove notes that copyright law provides liability when third parties facilitate a
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For example, the European Union and United States take very different approaches to privacy.
The European Union approach is largely codified in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
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largely relies upon unfair and deceptive business practice law and self-regulation [to protect privacy]. In
contrast, other nations, and most notably, the European Union have taken more aggressive steps to protect
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As Professor Solove notes, copyright law will provide remedies even when information has been
exposed to public view and has not been protected by the information holder against potential viral
distribution: SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184-5.
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useful model for enhanced privacy regulations online, particularly with respect to privacy
rights in video files.
Of course, copyrights are also specific legal rights that need to be balanced
against privacy rights online. The holder of the copyright in a video file will not
necessarily be the subject of the video image. Copyright ownership will usually fall to
the person who takes a photograph, not likely the subject of the image.195 Because today
we have strong copyright laws and relatively weak privacy laws, at least in the United
States, the copyright holder will generally win any battle for control of an online video
image.196 This does not necessarily have to be the case. Strengthened privacy laws could
help to redress this imbalance.197
In any event, the copyright model could be a useful basic model for those seeking
to strengthen privacy rights online. Although digital copyright law has arguably created
its own imbalances,198 those seeking to enact laws that protect privacy rights online could
learn from the past problems of digital copyright law, while taking away the lesson that
online information control through legal regulation is not impossible. Of course even
digital copyright law has been bolstered in many respects by contract law and technical
standards.199 It is another example of an area where legal regulation alone is not
sufficient as a regulatory modality, and where the law needs to interact with other
regulatory modalities. It is also an example of an area of law where balancing competing
interests is important. Privacy law advocates now have an opportunity to get the balance
right in the wake of some of the arguable failures of digital copyright law in this respect.

3. Lessons from Environmental Regulation
Environmental regulation is another area of law that may be instructive as a
model for protecting online privacy. Professor Hirsch, for example, draws on some of
the more recent legislative approaches to environmental protection as a possible model
for online privacy law.200 He identifies the way in which environmental law has moved
away from command and control models201 towards second generation initiatives that
195

id., at 184 (“Copyright in a photo is owned initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the
person whose photo is taken.”)
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Professor Solove recounts a story where, in a battle for control of such an image online, the holder
of copyright in the photograph was able to control a photograph of a radio call-in show host – Dr Laura
Schlessinger – even against Dr Schlessinger herself: SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note
___, at 183-184.
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online copyright law suggests that privacy law could be strengthened in a similar way).
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Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED (Jan. 1996) (available at
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Michael Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L REV
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encourage regulated parties to choose for themselves the means by which they will
achieve regulatory goals.202 He then draws on similarities between environmental
regulation and information regulation,203 to suggest lessons for information privacy law
that could usefully be drawn from the experience of environmental protection legislation.
He suggests that we look to the law as a means to facilitate the development of market
forces to achieve desired regulatory goals.204 Rather than suggesting enhanced
information privacy laws of the command and control variety, Professor Hirsch advocates
utilizing legal rules to set regulatory goals and to incentivize market players to achieve
those goals.205
Professors Mulligan and Simitian have taken this reasoning a step further in
discussing the efficacy of security breach notification laws in the United States.206
Professors Mulligan and Simitian identify information disclosure laws in the
environmental context as a useful analogy with information disclosure laws about
security breaches in the online privacy context.207 They note that information disclosure
laws in both contexts facilitate the flow of information into the marketplace and allow
market participants to make better and more efficient decisions about complying with
regulatory goals.208 In the environmental law context, the goals may be to reduce
pollution emissions. In the information security context, the goals may be to better
secure private information and to avoid data security breaches in the future. Professors
Mulligan and Simitian note that laws requiring companies that collect personal
information to disclose security breaches in relation to that information might give those
corporations, and others, sufficient market incentives to invest in technology to prevent
such breaches.209 This again evidences the important interplay between legal rules and
market forces as regulators. Of course, none of this specifically relates to the protection
of privacy in digital video images, but models could be developed to enhance video
privacy based on the interplay of laws and market forces along these lines. Some
suggestions are considered in Part III.E infra.

4. Privacy and Publicity Torts
202

id.
id., at 23 (“The privacy injuries of the Information Age are structurally similar to the
environmental damage of the smokestack era. Two key concepts that have bee used to understand
environmental damage – the “negative externality” and the “tragedy of the commons” – also shed light on
privacy issues.”); 63 (identifying other similarities between environmental regulation and information
regulation, including the fact that market players regulated by both areas of law: “undergo rapid change,
face stiff competition, and have the capacity for socially beneficial innovation.”)
204
id, at 37-39 (discussing benefits of second generation regulatory strategies in encouraging market
players to innovate in best methods for addressing regulatory goals).
205
id. (discussing benefits of second generation regulatory strategies in encouraging market players to
innovate in best methods for addressing regulatory goals).
206
Deirdre Mulligan and Joseph Simitian, Assessing Security Breach Notification Laws, work in
progress, copy on file with the author.
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id., at 10-11.
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id., at 11.
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id.; Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1527 (suggesting that in the absence of at least the threat of some
form of government regulation, there is little market incentive for online entities to invest in privacy
enhancing technologies).
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Having considered the viability of legal models for regulating information
generally, it is now appropriate to turn to specific areas of law that might be extended to
protect privacy interests in online video. An obvious port of call is the rather uncohesive
set of privacy torts in the United States210 which can be largely traced back to the work of
Dean Prosser in 1960.211 One or more of these torts could be strengthened to operate
more effectively in an online world. Professor Sanchez Abril, for example, has suggested
strengthening the tort relating to public disclosure of private facts212 to allow it to operate
more effectively in the OSN context.213 She notes that the public disclosure tort
developed at a time when the law was concerned with intrusions into physical spaces,214
and is thus not well suited to a non-physical online world.215 She suggests re-focusing
enquiries about public versus private activities, in the context of the public disclosure
tort, to better meet the needs of the information society. In particular, she suggests: (a)
thinking about zones of confidentiality created by system architecture, agreements and
relationship bonds, rather than physical walls;216 (b) categorizing privacy harms that
ensue from information disclosure rather than categorizing certain subject matter as per
se private;217 and, (c) thinking in terms of overall accessibility of online information
rather than in terms of whether it was completely secret or secluded.218
Related to the privacy torts is the right of publicity. This tort prevents the use of
someone else’s name or likeness for financial benefit.219 Professor Solove has suggested
that the right of publicity could be expanded to help individuals control uses and
dissemination of their images online.220 As currently formulated, the publicity rights tort
is limited to unauthorized commercial uses of an individual’s name or likeness. Thus, it
210

Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 652A-E (1997).
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 101 (describing the four types of harmful
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id, at 4 (concepts of physical space are no longer relevant in analyzing modern online privacy
harms).
216
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id.
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id.
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GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an
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SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort might be
expanded to encompass a broader set of problematic uses of information about a person …”)
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does not cover many of the situations arising by unauthorized posting and dissemination
of photographs on OSNs. Most of these uses are not for commercial gain, but merely for
amusement and discussion.221 Professor Solove recognizes that the right of publicity
could be strengthened for use in this context, but, as with utilizing the copyright model to
strengthen online privacy rights, difficult balancing issues would need to be resolved.222
Professor Solove suggests that one might find this balance in ensuring that the
appropriation tort could only apply: “when people’s photos are used in ways that are not
of public concern.”223 This would be consistent with recognized limitations of the public
disclosure tort.224 The appropriation limb of Dean Prosser’s privacy torts225 is clearly
related to the right of publicity tort, so similar comments would apply to extending this
arm of privacy law to OSNs as to the right of publicity tort.
However, the other elements of American privacy tort law are less promising for
the situations under consideration in this article. The intrusion tort226 relates largely to
incursions into one’s physical space or private affairs. It is unlikely to cover concerns
about unauthorized dissemination of video images often captured with the consent of the
image subject. Of course, the scope of this tort might be expanded to define an intrusion
more broadly, perhaps in a way that contemplates intrusions into a person’s peace of
mind by unauthorized use or dissemination of a private image. However, this does seem
a stretch and it may not always be easy to ascertain the scope of such an intrusion. The
suggestions of Professors Solove and Sanchez Abril seem to be simpler avenues to
achieve the desired result here.
The false light publicity tort227 is likewise not well suited to online video
situations because it is not aimed at truthful information – and images of an individual
will generally represent something truthful unless they have been altered in some way to
imply something untrue about the subject. An example might be photoshopping228 an
image to make it seem that the subject was drinking or taking drugs. Outside of the
obvious photoshopping example, it may be very difficult in particular cases to establish
false light in relation to an image that is effectively truthful in that it accurately recorded
221

id. (“The appropriation tort would rarely apply to the discussion on the Internet of people’s private
lives or the posting of their photos.”)
222
id. (querying how much control we want to give people over their images online).
223
id.
224
id.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name
or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”)
226
id., § 652B (“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”)
227
id., § 652E (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in
which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.”)
228
Wikipedia defines “photoshop” as follows: “Adobe Photoshop, or simply Photoshop, is a graphics
editing program developed and published by Adobe Systems. It is the current and primary market leader for
commercial bitmap and image manipulation, and is the flagship product of Adobe Systems.”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adobe_Photoshop, last viewed on July 24, 2008).
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a person in a given situation. Again, Professors Sanchez Abril’s and Solove’s
suggestions relating to extending the scope of the public disclosure tort and the publicity
rights tort respectively are probably better solutions to the problems identified here than
attempting to establish false light in the video privacy context.

5. Privacy Contracts and Breach of Confidence Actions
Another area where legal rules could better protect online privacy rights is
through the use of express or implied contracts, and breach of confidence actions. These
issues are treated together because they all rely on relationships between specific
individuals. Express or implied contracts arise from the conduct of the parties and their
intention to enter into legally binding obligations. Breach of confidence actions can arise
from contract law or can be imposed externally by the legal system to protect a
relationship that the law regards as requiring a particularly high duty of confidentiality
because of its very nature. Examples are the doctor-patient relationship and the preacherpenitent relationship.229
Relationships that give rise to legal obligations of confidence are a good model
for the legal regulation of privacy. The problem is that the kinds of situations addressed
in this article relating to online video privacy do not generally involve relationships that
the law would currently regard as involving legal obligations of confidence. However,
this could change. Express contracts of confidentiality might be problematic here
because it is unlikely that private individuals taking images of each other and posting
them online have the time, inclination, or experience to enter into express contracts to
protect each other’s privacy. However, implied contracts recognized by the legal system
might be a viable alternative.
Several commentators have recognized that implied contracts, and even express
contracts in some circumstances, could be utilized in interpersonal relationships for legal
enforcement of privacy and confidentiality expectations. Professor McClurg, for
example, has suggested the development of implied contracts of confidentiality for
intimate relationships generally.230 His suggestion contemplates protection for both textbased information shared in confidence and video information pertaining to the
relationship in question.231 His particular concern is with dissemination of that
information online.232 His ideas could be extended to social relationships more broadly,
particularly those that involve dissemination of information online.
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Professor McClurg’s writings echo suggestions made earlier by both Professor
Zimmerman233 and Professor Volokh234 about utilizing express or implied contracts,
rather than tort law, to protect individual privacy.235 Professors Zimmerman and Volokh
each expressed concern that tort law protections for privacy were generally open to
criticism as unconstitutional encroachments on the First Amendment freedom of
speech.236 Professor Volokh suggests that express or implied contracts of confidentiality,
although not a perfect solution for privacy advocates, are the only legal method of
avoiding these First Amendment concerns.237 However, he identifies two important
limitations of contractual solutions for protecting privacy that may have significant
ramifications in cyberspace. The first is that contractual enforcement will generally not
apply to third parties, unless, for example, the third party can be found to be an agent of
one of the contracting parties.238 In the OSN situation, people disseminating each other’s
images online are unlikely to be in contractual relationships with the image subjects for
the most part, and are also unlikely to be agents of image subjects or of image takers.
The second limitation of contractual solutions is that contracts cannot be enforced against
minors.239 This may be a significant problem in the OSN context because presumably
many people sharing images online are minors. Contractual solutions may also pose
jurisdictional problems online given the global nature of the Internet.
In a similar vein to those suggesting the recognition of implied contracts of
confidentiality, some commentators have suggested the extension of breach of confidence
torts to better protect individual privacy. Professors Solove and Richards suggest
extending American breach of confidence tort jurisprudence in a manner that draws from
current British law on breach of confidence.240 They note that British law, by default,
currently protects a greater array of relationships of confidence than American law.241
With respect to the First Amendment concerns raised by Professors Zimmerman and
Volokh, Professors Solove and Richards acknowledge that any tort law solution to
privacy problems is open to First Amendment challenge, and that tortious breach of
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confidence actions may be subject to the same critique.242 However, they suggest that
torts based on relationships may be less objectionable than torts generally enforceable
against the world where it comes to encroachments on speech.243
Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the tort approach, even when based on
relationships of confidence. Professors Solove and Richards have noted that the English
breach of confidence tort is subject to a number of exceptions including: (a) consent; (b)
information being trivial; (c) information being in the public domain; and, (d)
information being in the public interest.244 While the latter two issues are unlikely to be
of much relevance to the situations contemplated in this article, the first two limitations
on the action are potentially problematic. As noted in the opening section of this article,
many digital images are taken with consent. This does not necessarily mean that they are
disclosed with the consent of the image subject, although there will be a serious question
as to what a consent to a disclosure means in this context. If the image subject consents
to the posting of an image on a friend’s Facebook page, does that contemplate
downstream uses by others who may access the image from the friend’s page?
There is also the potential limitation that much information posted on OSNs is
trivial and should not give rise to tortious actions for breach of confidence. Again, there
are going to be some serious definitional problems here. Is it the information per se that
might be identified as trivial, or rather the context of its use online? For example, the
“Star Wars Kid” episode and the “dog poop girl” episode both revolve around digital
information that is per se fairly trivial. After all, how important is it that someone’s dog
pooped on the subway or that some kid played with a golf ball retriever as if it was a light
saber from Star Wars? The resulting harassment and embarrassment caused to the image
subject in each case was far from trivial on a personal level,245 yet this is a result of the
nature of the use of the images online, rather than the nature of the information contained
in the images. An otherwise fairly trivial image can take on a life of its own online.
Paradoxically, the triviality criterion that has previously cut against tort liability
for unauthorized disclosures would now arguably cut against First Amendment concerns
online. If information is trivial, there is arguably less need for the First Amendment to
protect it. Thus, if we are talking about balancing free speech interests against privacy, it
may be that the potential harm from disseminating even trivial information online so
seriously outweighs any First Amendment concerns that there should be no constitutional
objection to a tortious action here.
Another limitation of the breach of confidence tort on its own is that it does not
deal effectively with data aggregation, and sometimes associated identification,
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problems246 such as those arising in the “dog poop girl” scenario. It was not only the
subway passenger’s image that was ultimately posted on the Internet. It was augmented
by various Internet users with information relating to her identity and contact details.247
This allowed her to be easily harassed and shamed in an ongoing way, and ultimately
resulted in her quitting her job248 – a result of the permanence problem. An enhanced
breach of confidence tort action for the information age may well need to better take
account of the problems of viral distribution, aggregation, identification, and indeed,
information permanence, than existing legal models. Thus, solutions to privacy invasions
based on contractual or tortious breaches of relationships of confidence are a possible
solution to some of the problems addressed in this article. However, neither of them are
currently sufficiently developed to deal with these problems effectively.

6. Legislating Codes of Conduct and Technical Standards
Another way in which legal rules might be used to enhance privacy protections
involves utilizing laws to encourage certain social behaviors and technical standards.
This is perhaps an analog to the discussion of the environmental regulation model of
legislating best practices to encourage markets to behave in a particular way. Here, we
are talking about legislating best practices to encourage either markets or individuals, or
both, to behave in a particular way in terms of appropriate social conduct or the use and
development of particular technical standards to protect privacy.
Professors Edwards and Brown, for example, suggest the possibility of
developing voluntary codes of conduct or imposing legislation on OSNs with respect to
their default privacy settings.249 Drawing on the experience of the Directive on Privacy
and Electronic Communications in the European Union,250 Professors Edwards and
Brown surmise that legislating mandatory privacy default settings may prove more
effective in protecting individual privacy than leaving the market to its own devices.251
One advantage of such legislated privacy-protecting default settings would be that they
would also reinforce social norms relating to adequate privacy protections online.252 This
is a good example of the interplay between legal rules and emerging social norms.
In a similar vein, Professor Froomkin has suggested the enactment of legal rules
to encourage the use of privacy enhancing technologies.253 He has expressed skepticism
246
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about self-regulation, even given the availability of appropriate privacy enhancing
technologies.254 He advocates the interplay of legislation and resulting market forces to
more appropriately protect privacy online.255 He refers predominantly to text-based data
aggregation problems in the early days of the Internet, rather than to peer disseminations
of digital video images. However, his comments about the necessary interplay between
laws and market forces to encourage privacy-enhancing behaviors online are equally
applicable in this next context. He also advocates utilizing law to encourage the
incorporation of privacy protections into system design.256 This evidences the need for
an interplay between law, market forces, and system architecture as modes of regulation
to protect Internet privacy.
Legal rules do not only shape behavior through enforcement – or the threat of
enforcement. They are also part of a large and complex matrix of regulatory modalities
that shape behavior through a combination of carrots and sticks. In this context, legal
rules serve a variety of functions. They can command compliance with certain specific
rules in the command and control paradigm. They can also both reflect and shape social
norms. Lawmakers will likely be guided by social norms in enacting rules that reflect
society’s expectations about acceptable conduct. However, laws can also shape social
norms, as suggested by Professors Edwards and Brown observing that using law to
mandate default technological privacy settings can help to shape emerging social norms
about acceptable use of personal material online.257 Legal rules can also interact with
market forces, as observed by Professor Froomkin.258 Professor Gavison also suggested
the development of aspirational legal rules – such as a general explicit legal commitment
to privacy protection. This would presumably be a way to help educate society about
appropriate behavior with respect to personal information.259 Thus, the law can play
various roles in protecting online privacy generally, as well as specifically in the context
of OSNs. The goal for law and policy makers should be to identify the appropriate legal
rules to combat privacy problems online, and to ensure that these rules are suitably
tailored to the problems they are intended to address. Importantly, legal rules need to
interact efficiently and effectively with other regulatory modalities.

D. SOCIAL NORMS AS PRIVACY REGULATOR
Social norms are an extremely important form of regulation.260 A norm may be
defined as: “a rule governing an individual’s behavior that is diffusely enforced by third
parties other than state agents by means of social sanctions.”261 Norms can, in fact, be
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more significant than laws,262 particularly in areas that involve high levels of social
interaction, like privacy. As Professor Zimmerman has observed, “As a general rule,
legal standards for behavior cannot vary too greatly from accepted community practices
without creating a risk that the community will totally disregard the law.”263 Thus, norms
should inform the development of legal regulations, particularly where the laws are
intended to create standards for behavior.264
The problem with cyberspace in this context, is that many norms are not yet well
developed, meaning that it can be difficult in cyberspace to identify “accepted
community practices”. Particularly in relation to OSNs, norm development is in its
infancy because of the relative novelty of social networking technology. Add to that the
problems of globalization – are we talking about one global society’s norms? Or rather
an overlapping group of online societies, like the overlapping networks of “friends” on an
OSN? Yet another problem of identifying privacy norms online relates to the ambiguity
or cognitive disconnect that seems constantly to arise when people are surveyed about
online privacy. In the few surveys that have been conducted on attitudes to online
privacy, respondents generally rate the idea of privacy in the abstract very highly.265
However, they are prepared to bargain with their privacy for a very small price.266 An
online shopping coupon may well entice an individual to disclose voluminous personal
details with little regard to future uses of that information.267
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In 1983, Professor Zimmerman observed that the American privacy torts at that
time established norms for behavior that deviated substantially from accepted social
practices.268 This problem has likely been exacerbated today with the rise of OSNs and
other peer activities online. Indeed, as recently as 2006, Professor McClurg noted that
the primary social constraints online are conscience and common sense, and that these
attributes are “missing in many people”.269 So how do we identify and enforce social
norms as they relate to content, particularly video content, shared over OSNs?
Some empirical work may be helpful here, although, even empirical work has its
limits with respect to online privacy because individuals tend to undervalue their personal
information.270 There is an argument that empirical work may suffer less from this
privacy myopia problem271 in the OSN context than in the text-based data aggregation
context. In the latter context, where much of the survey work has been done so far,
consumers’ abstract expectations of privacy are often not aligned with their behavior
when faced with the choice of trading their information for some minor commercial
benefit, such as online shopping coupons or frequent flyer miles.272 In the OSN context,
on the other hand, there is little prospect of individuals bargaining with their personal
information for any commercial benefit,273 so survey results about privacy expectations in
this context may be more appropriately aligned with the way people actually behave
online.
If it is possible to ascertain any social expectations about online privacy in the
OSN context, these could usefully be reduced to Internet guidelines, somewhat akin to
the way that “Netiquette” developed in the early days of the Internet. Netiquette might be
defined as: “the rules of etiquette that apply when communicating over computer
networks, esp. the Internet”.274 In the early days of the Internet, netiquette generally
proponents (especially the self-regulators) argue that the value of the data is very low to the individuals.”);
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referred to attempts to articulate appropriate social norms with respect to the new email
technologies available at the time. In 1995, for example, Intel275 promulgated a set of
guidelines in the form of a generally available memo for the Internet community. This
memo was headed “Netiquette Guidelines”276 and contained suggestions about
appropriate use of email services for the then-new generation of Internet users who had
not “grown up with the Internet”.277
The idea was to set down a minimum set of appropriate email behaviors that
organizations and individuals could adapt for their own use.278 The Netiquette
Guidelines also recognized the role of Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and others who
may provide access to email services in developing rules and norms for appropriate email
use. The introductory section of the Guidelines explains that: “Individuals should be
aware that no matter who supplies their Internet access, be it an Internet Service Provider
through a private account, or a student account at a University, or an account through a
corporation, that those organizations have regulations about ownership of mail and files,
about what is proper to post or send, and how to present yourself. Be sure to check with
the local authority for specific guidelines.”279 This evidences the interplay of norms,
laws, and contractual provisions in the development of appropriate online behavior.
There are some parallels between early email netiquette and online behavior
involving OSNs today. Private organizations or individuals who may have a stake in the
future operation of OSNs might encourage the articulation of netiquette principles for
OSNs that take privacy issues into account. Indeed, as detailed in Part II.B, many OSN
service providers do incorporate some privacy provisions into their terms of use.
However, as also noted above, there are problems with enforcement of these terms
generally, and with the fact that many victims of privacy incursions are not parties to
those contracts. Some OSNs already have stated privacy policies that perhaps resemble
attempts to articulate new forms of netiquette.280 These are principles available to the
whole world as statements of best practices by an OSN provider in terms of its
aspirations to appropriately protect user privacy.281
However, terms of use and privacy policies differ from netiquette and pure social
norms in the sense that they are generally written from the point of view of an online
service provider, rather than the individuals utilizing the service. Thus, they generally
focus on explaining what the service provider will or will not do with personal
information, rather than with the kind of respect individual users of the service should
pay to each other’s privacy. Emerging online social norms, or netiquette, must take
account of both. They must explain the appropriate behavior of online service providers
275
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vis-à-vis private individuals, as well as explaining appropriate behavior of individuals
amongst themselves.282
Some OSNs do attempt to outline a form of netiquette, describing ways in which
users of their respective services should respect each other’s rights and interests.
YouTube and Flickr each have a set of “Community Guidelines” that attempt to describe
ways in which users of the respective online communities should treat each other.283
Flickr’s guidelines, for example, are expressed as being part of a user’s contract with
Flickr along with Flickr’s terms of use.284 They cover issues like ensuring that no
inappropriate content is posted, and remembering that children may be looking at
information and video files on Flickr. They additionally include terms like: “Flickr is
not a venue for you to harass, abuse, impersonate, or intimidate others. If we receive a
valid complaint about your conduct, we’ll send you a warning or terminate your
account”.285 Flickr also includes the simple suggestion: “Don’t be creepy.”286 The
guidelines do not say anything specifically about protecting others’ privacy rights,
although they do talk about protecting other people’s copyrights.287 In particular, Flickr
suggests ways of amicably resolving copyright disputes by encouraging first that a
complainant privately contact the alleged copyright violator. Then, if that does not
succeed, the complainant is requested to file a notice of infringement with the “Yahoo!
Copyright Team” who will resolve the matter.288
Interestingly, the Community Guidelines ask users of the service not to “upload
anything that isn’t theirs”.289 However, closer inspection of the relevant clause implies
that this is again geared towards copyright protection rather than privacy protection. The
succeeding definition of “stuff that isn’t yours” in this context states that: “This includes
282
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other people’s photos, video and/or stuff you've collected from around the Internet.” The
possessive pronoun here relates to “photos, videos and other stuff”, suggesting that it is
the ownership of a digital image that is important to Flickr, rather than the holder of
privacy interests in relation to the image. In other words, where the photographer is a
different person to the photographic subject, it would seem that Flickr’s guidelines only
contemplate protection of the photographer’s rights in the image, and not the rights of the
photographic subject. YouTube’s community guidelines similarly protect copyright, but
do not specifically mention privacy interests.290
In contrast to services like Flickr and YouTube, some of the closed networks like
MySpace and Facebook do not have specific sets of Community Guidelines outside of
their standard terms of use and privacy policies. This may be because their users are
automatically regarded as having more control of content because of the closed nature of
the network, so there is less perceived need to promulgate a set of community
guidelines.291 In other words, if users are able to limit views of their content to those
“friends” authorized to view and access their profiles, then there is less need for the
service provider to promulgate a set of rules about how community members should treat
each other. Community members can rely on the technical defaults they set to limit the
use others may make of their information.292 Of course, as the preceding discussion has
demonstrated, this is only true to a point, but it may explain the difference in style
between open and closed networks in terms of the perceived need to articulate
community guidelines.
Now in the emerging days of OSNs might be a good time to take stock of video
privacy norms, both through empirical studies and through some attempts to expressly
articulate norms about privacy in this context. For example, Professors Edwards and
Brown have recently noted that there currently appear to be no existing social norms
against the “tagging” of photographs to make them more easily searchable.293 However,
this issue could be discussed in a forum to develop online best practices between OSN
users and amongst OSN users and OSN providers. Salient issues to consider would be
290
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whether tagging photographs might somehow impinge on a video subject’s expectations
of privacy. Even if an individual has consented to the posting of her image on Facebook,
and acknowledges the possibility that others may see it and copy it, does that necessarily
mean that she consents to tagging which enables easier and potentially larger scale
searching and copying of the image?294 It would be interesting to find out how OSN
users feel about this issue. On a more basic level, it would be interesting to try and
articulate just what kinds of uses or precautions against re-use are expected by those
sharing video images online.295
The problem of identifying and articulating appropriate social norms for OSNs
should not be underestimated. Professor Grimmelman has recently noted that even in the
context of email – one of the more ubiquitous and long term aspects of Internet
communication – social norms have their limits.296 Even for email which has relatively
well developed social norms, the ever-changing landscape of the Internet, in terms of
increasingly rapid and voluminous connections between ever larger groups of people,
causes these norms to falter in certain situations.297 Thus, social norms are a useful and
integral part of Internet communications,298 and should be articulated and developed as a
meaningful part of Internet regulation generally, and OSN regulation in particular.
However, norms, like laws, must interact with other modes of regulation to be truly
effective in practice.

E. MARKET FORCES AS PRIVACY REGULATOR
Market forces as a regulatory modality often go hand in hand with social norms.
Social desires and expectations dictate, to a certain extent, what the market is able to sell,
and, conversely, and perhaps paradoxically, the market can dictate social norms through
the nature of its products and services. If all market players provide products that only
conform with a certain sub-set of possible social behaviors then social behaviors will, by
default, have to conform with what is available on the market. However, if the
consumers are not happy with the available choices, they may either refuse to buy a
service at all, or they may petition the service provider to change the service to better
294
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conform with their desires and expectations. The immediate user backlash against
Facebook’s “Beacon” advertising scheme launched in late 2007 is an example of
consumers demanding changes to an online service to better suit their privacy
expectations.299
Over the course of Internet governance debates generally, many commentators
have expressed skepticism about the ability, or inclination, of markets to regulate online
privacy appropriately.300 The Internet causes the unprecedented ability of online market
players to make financial gains from individuals’ personal information with very little
legal recourse available for those who are concerned about protecting their privacy.
Where the incentives are missing for markets to protect their customers’ privacy, there is
likely to be little realistic self-regulation absent at least a serious threat of government
intervention.301
However, in the specific situations under discussion in this article, it is possible
that industry self-regulation might fare better than it has in the context of text-based data
aggregation. In the OSN context, at least as relates to video images, we are not talking
about information that has commercial value when aggregated into large databases.302
While text-based information from a personal profile on Facebook might be of interest to
online marketers, video information is less likely to have any significant appeal. Even if
it were possible to utilize images to ascertain whether an image subject might be
interested in a certain style of clothing, for example, the difficulties in processing video
information in this way likely outweigh any commensurate benefits of doing so.
Additionally, video information may not be linked to a particular person’s identity so a
targeted marketer would have no guidance as to how to target advertisements to an image
subject.303 The fact that your image is available on my Facebook page does not
necessarily give a data aggregator searching that image any personally identifying
information that would necessarily enable them to find you for the purposes of
aggregating data about you. Of course, the image may be tagged with some of your
identifying details, or may be accompanied by text identifying you. However, it would
be much more difficult for a data aggregator to profit from this information as it is to deal
299
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with text-based information disclosed directly to a company online during an Internet
purchase - or even personal information derived from tracking a person’s web-surfing
habits.
Because of these attributes of online video, it is arguable that the interests of OSN
service providers and those of their users in terms of privacy protection are not so
disparate as the interests of e-commerce merchants and their consumers. If the OSN
service providers obtain more commercial value by protecting their users’ privacy than
by failing to do so, there may well be market incentives for those service providers to
compete with each other in offering stronger forms of privacy protections for their users.
Facebook, for example, does offer more detailed privacy protections in relation to video
files than some of its competitors as identified in Part II.B. However, the fact that it has
strongly worded privacy protections in its terms of use does not necessarily mean that it
enforces those terms in practice. Additionally, Facebook is an interesting example in that
it markets itself as having strong privacy protections. Nevertheless, it has been strongly
criticized for attempts to utilize information derived from its users to market items to
their online “friends”.304
This evidences a distinct practical problem with over-reliance on market forces as
a form of online privacy regulation. What an entity says it does, and what it actually
does, with respect to its users’ privacy may be two different things. An online service
provider can use promises of privacy to entice users to accept its services, and then can
fail to live up to those promises even to the extent of engaging in conduct that seems to
completely contradict its promises.305 Of course, in a perfect market, the consumer would
simply take her business elsewhere. Yet, in online markets there is often no competitive
“elsewhere” to go. If you want to interact socially online, you often have little choice
between service providers, as is often the case in the physical world with a variety of
products and services. The other problem that may inhere in cyberspace as it does in the
physical world is that the terms of service of competing service providers may be so
complex and different, and difficult to compare, that in the absence of a requirement of
some standardized format to provide consumers with necessary comparative
information,306 consumers will be unable to make meaningful choices.
There are a number of other difficulties with reliance on privacy policies to
protect consumers’ interests online. There are problems of inequality of bargaining
power between consumers and online service providers with respect to privacy policies.307
Even if a large group of consumers objects to a given privacy policy, there are collective
action problems because it is often difficult in practice for consumers to collectively
304
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express to online service providers their privacy preferences.308 The drafting of privacy
policies in current practice also tends to be fairly toothless in terms of a serious attempt at
protecting user privacy. These policies are often drafted in vague, aspirational terms with
little serious attempt at making specific representations of exactly how a user’s privacy
will be protected.309 Additionally, privacy policies tend to be regularly updated
unilaterally by online service providers, thus putting an unrealistic obligation on users to
routinely check back on the policy to keep track of the privacy terms.310
Market forces may be a useful and important form of online regulation. However,
it seems that market incentives are often insufficient in online contexts to effectively
protect users’ privacy interests.311 This may be an area in which it is necessary for legal
rules to interact with market forces to create more appropriate outcomes.312 There are a
number of ways in which the law can interact with markets to achieve more socially
beneficial outcomes than markets achieve on their own. Obviously, command and
control regimes may work here, provided that there is a realistic threat of enforcement of
laws requiring appropriate levels of privacy protection by online service providers. A
command and control regime may, for example, require market players to maintain and
enforce their privacy policies, with threats of legal action for failure to do so.313
There may also be more subtle ways in which the law can encourage market
players to act in desired ways. As noted in Part III.C.3, Professors Mulligan and Simitian
have observed ways in which data breach disclosure laws can provide necessary
incentives for markets to engage in best practices when dealing with personally sensitive
information.314 This model draws to some extent from recent approaches to
environmental regulation, and can be an effective way to encourage market players to
invest adequate time and resources into developing best practices in a given area.315 Such
a model could be extended to encourage online service providers to utilize contractual
and technological means to protect their users’ privacy.
As noted in Part III.C.6, Professors Edwards and Brown have suggested
legislation as a way to require market players to utilize certain default privacy settings to
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protect the privacy interests of their users.316 They also suggest the development of model
contracts that could be incorporated into OSNs’ terms of use to protect privacy.317 This
could presumably be achieved as a private market-based exercise or through legislation,
or a combination of both. In fact, Professor Solove has additionally suggested that laws
could be utilized much better than they currently are to ensure meaningful enforcement of
privacy contracts.318 He notes that, in the past, enforcement of privacy contracts has been
problematic because courts have generally required proof of monetary damages.319 Laws
could alter this paradigm to allow compensation for other types of harms resulting from
infringements of privacy contracts.
As with legal regulation and social norms, market solutions are not, and are never
likely to be, a perfect form of online privacy regulation on their own. Nevertheless, in
concert with the other modes of regulation, they will be an important factor in the
developing online privacy protection matrix. Without buy-in from online service
providers, whether it be obtained through carrots or sticks, or through a combination of
both, there is little hope of meaningfully protecting privacy online. While social norms
between individuals should develop to protect privacy rights online, the cooperation of
service providers will be necessary to effectively enforce privacy expectations in the
future.

F. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AS PRIVACY REGULATOR
While commentators have generally expressed skepticism about market forces per
se as privacy regulators, they have been more optimistic about the potential to utilize
system architecture to better protect online privacy. Professor Lessig has defined system
architecture in the privacy context as: “technologies for re-creating privacy where other
technologies may have erased it.”320 Many commentators have acknowledged the
profound impact that system architecture potentially has on personal privacy online.321
One obvious advantage of architecture as a regulatory modality for privacy is that it is
more proactive than other forms of regulation, notably legal regulation.322 Architecture
316
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creates structures upfront that are intended to prevent harm, while laws generally provide
remedies when harms occur.323
However, again the problem with reliance on architecture as a privacy regulator is
that it does not necessarily work well on its own. Privacy-enhancing technologies can be
expensive and there is often little to no market incentive for online service providers to
invest in it. Already ubiquitous privacy enhancing technologies in the hands of
consumers that are included in much available software can be problematic in that many
consumers do not have the technological know-how to use them effectively (or at all).
The solution may be to “change the default settings” in a number of ways: that is, to sell
software with the privacy-protecting default settings turned on at their highest level, and
to require online service providers to invest in technologies to protect their users’ privacy.
However, this may require legal intervention to achieve the desired results. Professors
Edwards and Brown suggest that laws may be needed that require OSN providers to
change their default positions on privacy.324
One issue for OSNs will be to identify available system architectures to protect
user privacy. An obvious example is the closed network format utilized by Facebook and
MySpace. These services use available technology to limit users to accessing
information of other users that they are authorized to access. On Facebook, for example,
you cannot access any detailed information about another user unless you ask them if you
can be their “friend” and they accept you as a “friend” over the network.325 Given the
easy availability of these options, one might ask why Internet users posting video images
continually flock to open services like YouTube. This may be evidence of social norms
and market forces at play. Customers who are less concerned about privacy may
arguably be using open networks and those who are more concerned about privacy are
flocking to Facebook.326 YouTube is also geared towards audio-visual, multimedia
content, whereas Facebook caters to a variety of different kinds of content. That is also a
function of the respective services’ market segment.
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There are other examples where technological solutions may be implemented to
better protect online video privacy. For example, Professors Edwards and Brown have
suggested the possibility of automatic data expiration settings to combat the permanency
problem of digital data in the OSN context.327 Of course, this does not deal with the
problems of unauthorized dissemination of relevant images prior to the expiration of the
original posted image, or the permanence of any copies made available on other websites.
Especially if images have been tagged, they may still be easy to find on multiple websites
even after the original image has been removed from an online profile. However,
automatic expiration settings would, to some extent, limit the availability of personal
information online. Additionally, if multiple sites adopted the practice of automatic data
expiration, then even copied images would eventually be removed from multiple sites,
thus potentially lessening the permanency problem to some extent.
Technological solutions might also be developed to prevent unauthorized cutting
and pasting of digital video files in the absence of consent by the image holder and the
image subject. For example, code could be written that would prohibit cutting and
pasting initially, while at the same time sending a request to the image holder and image
subject to request permission to the dissemination of the image. The holder and subject
could then respond, and that response would translate into a permission or nonpermission to the requester to copy the image. If a response was not received from either
the image holder or the image subject, the default setting would presumably be to refuse
permission to copy the image. Alternatively, or additionally, the image could simply be
tagged with permissions when originally uploaded.328 This would not prevent
unauthorized disseminations of images per se, but it would be a use of technology that
could bring the privacy preferences of the image subject into public view. Thus, this
approach may assist in online norm development with respect to the protection of others’
privacy. In fact, some OSNs are experimenting with these kinds of tags. Facebook has
offered technology to label photographs in order to indicate what groups of people are
authorized to view them.329 However, this technological solution is somewhat limited in
that the relevant tags are lost once an image is copied outside the Facebook network.330
This discussion has not been a comprehensive survey of possible technological
solutions to video privacy problems. It is merely intended to establish that there are
technological options that have not yet been seriously investigated that could better
protect online video privacy than is currently the case in practice. Many of the
technologies that would enable enhanced privacy protection for video images are in
327
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existence today and have yet to be applied in this context.331 The failure to apply them
likely has to do with a combination of factors including: (a) assumptions by some online
service providers that users’ do not care sufficiently about privacy to make it worth their
while to employ these technologies;332 (b) lack of awareness of these technologies by
users; (c) lack of financial incentives for online service providers to develop and deploy
these technologies;333 and, (d) lack of clarity about current and emerging social norms in
relation to online privacy, particularly in the video and multi-media context.
Some of the more obvious advantages to developing technological solutions to
emerging privacy problems are their effectiveness334 and their global reach.335 As noted
by Professors Edwards and Brown, if OSNs such as Facebook wanted to better protect
privacy on a global scale, it would be a simple matter for them to create privacy defaults
as a matter of system architecture that would operate in all countries where Facebook was
accessible to users.336 These professors further note that such a system could be
facilitated by a matrix of statutes that legislate for more privacy-friendly default settings,
thus utilizing law to encourage the development of technological solutions.337 Again, we
see the likely need for technological solutions to interact with laws and other modes of
regulation in order to be truly effective in practice.

G. OTHER MODES OF REGULATION
1. Education as Privacy Regulator
As Professor Lessig suggested in the early days of the Internet, to understand
online regulation – or any regulation for that matter - it is necessary to understand the
interplay of at least four regulatory modalities – legal rules, social norms, market forces,
and system architecture.338 However, this may not be the end of the story. In recent
years, commentators have suggested new modes of regulation that may be equally
important online, particularly with respect to protecting individual privacy interests. This
is not inconsistent with Professor Lessig’s work. He did not claim that the four
331
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regulatory modalities that he identified were intended to be comprehensive.339 Other
forms of regulatory constraint are possible. Professors Edwards and Brown, for example,
have suggested the importance of public education as a mode of regulation for privacy
interests in the OSN context.340 Professor Solove has similarly indicated the importance
of public education as at least a partial answer to online privacy problems.341
Of course, one may define public education as merely being a subset of social
norms in the sense that education of the public will ultimately help to identify social
norms as it will focus the attention of the public on a particular issue in a way likely to
shape public attitudes about the issue. However, for present purposes, it may be useful to
regard public education as a separate subset of information regulation. This separate
focus allows us to identify the kinds of education that may become important in the
privacy context. We should also consider who has responsibility to educate the public,
and how prescriptive or otherwise such education may be. If, for example, social norms
really are yet to develop in many online privacy contexts, then the education side of the
regulatory equation, at least at this point in time, should perhaps be aimed at eliciting
views from the public rather than instructing the public about privacy. On the other hand,
the public should certainly be instructed about available privacy-enhancing technologies
so they might put more pressure on online service providers to employ those technologies
or make them more widely available. Additionally, where such technologies are already
available but the public has little information about how to use them, public education is
an important form of regulation to address this disconnect.
Professor Froomkin has suggested, at least in the context of unauthorized data
aggregation, that public education may become a regulatory modality for privacy along
with other avenues such as technological responses and legal solutions.342 It is probably
safe to say that public education is an important, if under-utilized, regulatory modality for
online privacy, both in the video context and with respect to unauthorized uses and
disseminations of personal information more generally. Even if the education component
only consists of explanations about the loss of control people increasingly have over their
personal information online, this might inform the development of social norms. It might
facilitate a situation where Internet users are more cautious about what information they
disclose online, both about themselves and about their friends and acquaintances.

2. Institutions as Privacy Regulators
Another possible mode of regulating privacy has recently been suggested by
Professor Richards. In the context of conceptualizing a new theory of “intellectual
339
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privacy”, he has identified institutions as potential forms of privacy regulators.343 In this
context, he utilizes the example of libraries, and in particular, the American Library
Association (“ALA”) in promoting free speech values and intellectual liberty against the
threat of government surveillance.344 He discusses the ALA’s 1939 library bill of rights
which declared aspirations of intellectual freedom and privacy of library patrons.345 Of
course, one might suggest that the idea of “institutions as regulators” is really a subset of
market forces as a regulatory modality. However, there are subtle differences. Market
forces are determined largely by commercial interests. Institutional interests, however,
may be more aspirational and focused on the needs of bettering society generally.
In fact, even Professor Lessig has recognized the work of non-profit institutions
as a potential regulatory modality in the digital copyright context. In the Afterword of his
text, Free Culture, he cites the examples of the Public Library of Science (“PLoS”)346 and
the Creative Commons347 as non-profit organizations whose work aims to better balance
the rights of the public to utilize copyright works against the commercial interests of
content holders. The PLoS is a nonprofit organization that maintains a repository of
scientific work in electronic form that is made permanently available for free.348 The
Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation that aims to facilitate copyright holders in
granting more flexible permissions for uses of their works.349 Creative Commons
describes its mission as follows: “Creative Commons provides free tools that let authors,
scientists, artists, and educators easily mark their creative work with the freedoms they
want it to carry. You can use CC to change your copyright terms from "All Rights
Reserved" to "Some Rights Reserved”.”350
The question for video privacy in the OSN context, and online privacy generally,
is whether there are currently any institutions that could fulfill an institutional regulatory
function, such as the function performed by the ALA in protecting library patrons’
intellectual privacy. Because most of the players in the OSN privacy matrix are
commercial enterprises and private Internet users, it is perhaps difficult to identify an
analog to the ALA in the library context. The closest obvious contenders are probably
some public interest organizations that aim to protect rights and freedoms generally
online. Examples are the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”),351 and the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”).352
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These organizations tend not to be particularly well funded,353 at least as compared
with corporate interests. They certainly do important work in advocating for the rights of
Internet users who may not be able to protect their own privacy interests online because
of collective action problems, or lack of knowledge about relevant law and technology.
Perhaps part of the regulatory equation for protecting privacy online in the future should
be to pay more attention to, and encourage funding for, organizations such as the EFF
and EPIC. At the very least, these kinds of institutions can play an important regulatory
role, particularly in concert with public education in protecting online privacy. These
organizations already perform a public education role in the sense of the media coverage
they obtain for their activities,354 and the public lectures their officers provide on online
liberties.355 Their websites also contain much educational information about individual
rights online. It may be that greater focus on public education as a modality of regulation
for online privacy could cast more light on the activities of organizations that are already
attempting to publicize issues relating to individual freedoms online.
Academic institutions are another example of largely non-profit institutions that
can play an important public education role.356 They can assist in developing statements
of best practices about online privacy, as well as disseminating information to the public
about these issues. This is already done in terms of academic conferences and symposia
on these issues.357 However, a greater array of publications, and greater accessibility of
conferences and conference proceedings, including free online availability,358 could be a
useful aspect of the ongoing privacy regulation matrix. Clearly public education and
institutions as regulatory modalities have a lot of synergies between them, and could be
more usefully employed in the future development of online privacy principles, alongside
legal rules, social norms, market forces, and system architecture.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Privacy rights online have been of growing concern in the past decade or so as
privacy destroying technologies increase in prevalence.359 As noted by Professor Solove,
much of the destruction of privacy online is incidental to other activities being relatively
to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.” (see www.epic.org, last viewed on July
23, 2008).
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innocently, if somewhat carelessly, conducted by online actors.360 The rise of OSNs is yet
another area in which those interacting relatively innocently online are creating
potentially long term threats to individual privacy. A number of regulatory avenues have
already been identified to better protect digital privacy problems. They include legal
rules, social norms, market forces, system architecture, public education, and an
enhanced role of institutions as regulators. The problem is the pace of change and
development of technologies for gathering and sharing both text-based and video/multimedia information. By the time the regulatory modalities have been effectively deployed
to counteract new technological privacy problems, much personal information, including
potentially damaging or embarrassing information in video formats, will already be
widely displayed online. It is now time to start thinking more carefully about the
potential of each regulatory modality, and the most efficient way for the regulatory
modalities to interact with each other to protect online privacy interests.
This Article has examined a number of advantages and disadvantages of six
distinct, yet interrelated, regulatory modalities. It has considered ways in which these
modalities could be employed to better protect privacy interests in digital images, noting
that digital images raise privacy concerns that are often distinct from those that arise in
relation to the gathering and dissemination of text-based data about individuals. One of
the most salient problems with digital video images is that the image subject is usually a
different person to the person who originally captured the image and posted it online.
The image taker may well be protected by copyright law, but this will be of no avail to
the image subject seeking to protect her online privacy.
One might argue that there is no need to focus on digital privacy, or more
particularly digital video privacy, in the short term. Commentators have suggested in the
past that privacy is not a highly held value in cyberspace so there is no need to protect
it.361 With respect to OSNs in particular, some would argue that privacy concerns are a
“blip” phenomenon, and that time will educate Internet users to be more careful about
video images and other information they place online, or allow to be placed online about
them.362 However, these views are not universally accepted. There are explanations for
Internet users’ apparent lack of concern for privacy, including: (a) their lack of education
about potential privacy breaches and impacts of those breaches on their lives, (b) the lack
of forethought that young people often put into their actions while they are developing
their lives and personalities and using OSNs to do so; and, (c) the lack of meaningful
modes of protecting online privacy for those who want to take advantage of online
services such as OSNs.
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There is also a body of literature arguing that an attempt to regulate privacy online
today is like locking the barn door after the horse has bolted.363 Some commentators have
suggested that the appropriate approach to remedying privacy breaches in the 21st century
is to focus on specific damages caused by leaks of personal information, including
discrimination in the workplace, healthcare, and education.364 Indeed, some have
suggested that the benefits of profiling and lack of privacy could theoretically outweigh
the costs in the long term.365 In particular, Professor Strahilevitz has argued that the widescale dissemination of personal information can actually help the public understand
existing social norms.366
However, there is reason to be skeptical of an approach that focuses not on
protecting privacy, but solely on specific harms caused by resultant leaks of information.
For one thing, many insecurities involving personal information do not result in specific
harms in terms of possible racial profiling in health care, education, and employment, or
even identity theft.367 In fact, many online privacy incursions do not result in any one
specific harm, but rather in a general culture of unease where individuals cannot rely on
anyone taking care or control over sensitive information about them.368
Another objection to attempting to develop Internet privacy regulation arises from
the global nature of the Internet. Cyberspace has historically raised jurisdictional
concerns – and the idea has been voiced that the Internet cannot369 and arguably should
not be regulated because it would be tantamount to an attempt to impose one country’s
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laws on the rest of the world.370 There are at least two answers to this argument. The first
is that history has shown that the Internet can be regulated and indeed has been
effectively regulated in a number of areas – notably the protection of intellectual property
rights online.371 The second is that difficulties inherent in Internet regulation depend to a
large extent on the subject matter of the regulation. In areas where cross-cultural views
of particular problems can be aligned fairly easily on a substantive level, international
regulation is not so difficult.
Some domestic examples in a federal system can illustrate this point easily
enough. In the United States, legislatures at both the state and federal level have had
much more trouble enacting legislation to protect minors from indecent and harmful
online content372 than they have had in enacting legislation to curtail unsolicited
commercial emails (or “spam”).373 One of the reasons why this has been the case is that
there is less substantive disagreement between social groups about the contours of
appropriate regulatory responses to spam374 than there is on defining content harmful to
minors.375
One of the leading privacy experts, Professor Solove, has suggested that despite
disharmonization in terms of values and terminology ascribed to privacy protection in
370

See, for example, Dow Jones & Co v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec 2002), ¶ 200 per Justice
Callinan (“[W]hat the appellant seeks to do is to impose upon Australian residents for the purposes of this
and many other cases, an American legal hegemony in relation to Internet publications. The consequence,
if the appellant’s submission were to be accepted would be to confer upon one country, and one notably
more benevolent to the commercial and other media than this one, an effective domain over the law of
defamation, to the financial advantage of publishers in the United States, and the serious disadvantage of
those unfortunate enough to be reputationally damaged outside the United States.”) (available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html, last viewed on July 25, 2008).
371
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184 (“Control in the privacy context is
seen as outlandish or impossible. Copyright law demonstrates otherwise. It reveals that the law is willing
and able to control information.”)
372
See, for example, American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(striking down state law that made it illegal to distribute material harmful to minors over the Internet); Reno
v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down sections of federal Communications
Decency Act of 1996 that attempted to limit the distribution of inappropriate content over the Internet);
Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (striking down sections of federal Child
Online Protection Act that attempted to protect minors from inappropriate Internet content). However,
contrast these cases with United States v American Library Association, Inc, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (in which
the Children’s Internet Protection Act was upheld with respect to conditioning government funding for
libraries on their willingness to utilize filtering software to protect minors from inappropriate material
online).
373
State of Washington v Heckel, 122 Wn. App. 60; 93 P. 3d 189 (2004) (upholding state legislation
restricting certain aspects of unsolicited commercial email).
374
See, for example, State of Washington v Heckel, 143 Wn.2d 824, 837-838; 24 P.3d 404,411-412;
(2001); aff’d 122 Wn. App. 60; 93 P. 3d 189 (2004) (noting that different state laws regulating unsolicited
commercial email were drafted in substantially the same terms, so that it was not imposing an undue
burden on a defendant to require him to comply with a given state’s laws for the purposes of the Dorment
Commerce Clause analysis).
375
See, for example, Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 577 (2002)
(describing a law’s attempts to regulate online speech with relation to “community standards” as being
problematic because community standards are widely divergent in different geographic areas even within
the United States).

60

REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY
different countries, there is “a significant degree of consensus about the kinds of
problems involved.”376 If this is indeed the case, globalization arguably does not pose a
significant problem to privacy regulation. Laws and social norms identified in one
country are unlikely to be strikingly dissimilar to those in other countries. Additionally,
as pointed out by Professors Edwards and Brown, technological solutions to privacy
problems can easily have a global reach.377 Thus, if there is relative consensus on aims of
privacy regulation amongst cultures, this enables laws and norms to develop that
effectively have a global reach and that can easily enough be bolstered by globally
applicable technological solutions to privacy problems. Regulators could also achieve
global economies of scale in public education initiatives if the concerns of the public in
different countries are largely the same in substance.
Many commentators have indicated that a multi-pronged regulatory approach is
necessary with respect to cyberspace generally.378 Others have applied this view to
privacy protections more specifically.379 This work has been extremely important and
useful and must continue to be extended to deal with new privacy issues as they arise
online. One of the newer issues is the relative lack of privacy protection for video images
and other multi-media files shared over OSNs. The above discussion has utilized this
example to demonstrate how a multi-pronged regulatory approach can address these
social concerns in ways that fill in gaps in the current legal matrix for privacy protection.
Exercises like this will continue to be necessary in the future as new technologies arise
that enable new types of privacy incursions. This article has demonstrated the need to
think in terms of often intricate and detailed interactions of various regulatory approaches
in order to achieve more appropriate balances of privacy rights and other interests in
cyberspace. It will hopefully serve as a useful model for future discourse on online
privacy protections more generally.
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